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ABSTRACT
Trade and the Environment:
A Political Model of International Public Goods Problem
Qingshui Zhou
In recent decades there has been a debate over the entwined issues of trade and the
environment, and the 1990s witnessed a great rise in global environmental concerns. The
purpose of the present study is to seek a cooperative solution to these concerns.
Postwar environmental movement, interaction of trade and the environment, and the
reconciliation issues are reviewed. Methodologies to studying these issues are categorized
into 1) international trade approaches, and 2) environmental economics approaches.
A political model - cost sharing game is then proposed. Specifically, environmental
problems resulting from trade are treated as international public goods and the issue of
optimal provision of public goods is analyzed in a game-theoretic framework. The economy
consists of one public good, one private good, and a set of agents (sovereign countries or
regions). Each agent’s strategy is to decide the levels of his private consumption and
resources devoted to public goods provision, given his budget constraint. It is shown that
the cooperative game with a gama-characteristic function has a unique equilibrium which
is Pareto efficient. Further, a new solution concept - Gini Ratio Equilibrium (GRE) is
developed which combines the virtues of all three fundamental modes of cooperations, i.e.,
direct agreement, justice and decentralized behavior. Finally, a taxation model is adopted
to implement the GRE model. Thus the cost share for each agent is determined by a single
political parameter - the elasticity of the cost share, given the total cost of the public good
and the distribution of the initial endowments.
The model is applied to the global warming case by showing how to finance a forest
preservation project. The assumed player set is 195 countries, the total GDP of each country
is the endowment, and the project cost is $9.9 billion. Cost shares for each country (and
hence per-capita share) are calculated under three different elasticities: -0.3, 0, and 0.3. The
United States (per-capita GDP $25,514) incurs the biggest share, with per-capita cost shares
of $7.63, $9.69, and $10.85, respectively, for the three elasticities; while SaoTome and
Principe (per-capita GDP $120) incurs the smallest one, with per-capita shares of $0.01,
$0.05, and $0.18, respectively.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Environmental problems as the consequence of human activities are almost as old
as the history of human beings. Air pollution may be traced back to the first use of fire on
the earth. The increase of human activities due to population growth and technological
progress inevitably brings about increasing environmental consequences. Mismanagement
of environment cum population growth led to the abandonment of Sumerian cities some
3700 years ago (Earthscan 1984) and the tenth-century collapse of the Mayan civilization
(Deevey et al.1979). By trial-and-error and scientific discovery, man has gradually
recognized the environmental consequences of his actions and learned, generally, how to
cope with them. Indeed, today's civilizations are the results of the mankind's struggles with
and uses of the environment.
International trade is the exchange of goods and services between members of
different nations. To the extent that the production and consumption of goods and services
inevitably brings about environmental consequences, the relationships of trade and
environmental issues have existed, implicitly, since the first time such an exchange occurred.
However, international trade is often considered a remedy for or buffer to environmental
problems. This can be seen in Adam Smith's famous work, The Wealth of Nations. Smith
(1776) treated international trade as a particular instance of specialization: in a world where
productive resources are scarce and human wants cannot be completely satisfied, each

1

nation should specialize in the production of the goods it is particularly well equipped to
produce, and trade them for other goods that it cannot so readily turn out. David Ricardo
(1817) refined these ideas as the principle of comparative advantage, which was later
expanded into the Hechscher-Ohlin theory of factor endowments (Ohlin 1933).
With international trade, the agricultural and industrial revolutions sowed the seeds
of global environmental problems during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Meanwhile, the unprecedented fast growth rate of population during these periods gave rise
to the question about the availability of natural resources. This idea was suggested in
Malthus' (1798) celebrated book: Essay on Population. Despite this, there was little sense
of alarm or concern. Environmental problems were, at best, treated as local or domestic
issues. At the same time, international trade served both as an engine of growth and as a
remedy for domestic problems during these periods (Robertson 1938).
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, international perspectives on
environmental concerns have begun to emerge. This can be attributed mainly to technical
advances in communications and transportation, and the expansion of international trade in
the nineteenth century. However, during the first half of twentieth century international
efforts on resource use and environmental management had little success, due to the obvious
reasons (McCormick 1989)1.
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The discussion of international environmental movement in this and next chapters draws
heavily on McCormick's (1989) book - Reclaiming Paradise. Courteousness and
acknowledgment apply.
2

After the Second World War, the economies of the world became increasingly
interdependent and environmental problems together with related political and
socioeconomic issues became more explicit in the international arena. A major landmark
in the rise of the international environmental movement was the United Nations Scientific
Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources held in New York in 1949.
However, the foresight of its agenda was ignored for two decades, until the late 1960s when
environmental "crises" occurred in the United States, Canada, Japan, and most countries of
western Europe. This led to the 1968 Biosphere Conference and the 1972 Stockholm
Conference.
Academic debates over trade and environmental issues emerged in the early 1970s.
However, after the oil price shock which led to a productivity slowdown and deflationary
policies in most western countries, the public became more concerned about economic
growth than environmental issues and research efforts in the following fifteen years or so
were misplaced. It was not until the release of the Brundt report, Our Common Future, by
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987), that a global
environmental movement re-emerged and debates over trade and the environment were
intensified and became more complicated. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed a great
rise in global environmental concerns.
The purpose of this study is to search for a solution to the global environmental
concerns. Literature on the entwined trade-environmental issue grew rapidly in the current
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decade. Different approaches have been used in the analyses of trade and environmental
problems and many solutions recommended. It is recognized that environmental issues are
real, fundamentally political in nature and that traditional trade instruments are, at best,
second best policies. In the present study the issues are distinguished by two aspects national and international. It is argued that the global system of carbon tax or emission
trading markets is infeasible. To offer a cooperative solution to the environmental concern,
a political model of the international public goods problem is proposed. Specifically,
environmental problems resulting from international trade are treated as pure public goods
in the world economy and a new solution concept for public goods equilibrium - Gini Ratio
Equilibrium is established. This solution combines the virtues of all three fundamental modes
of cooperation, i.e., direct agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior (Moulin 1995).
As a cost-sharing game, its application is illustrated using the global warming case.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II reviews recent trends and
developments in trade and environmental issues. It describes the post-war environmental
movement, the debates over the two-way effects of trade and the environment, and the
issues of trade and the environmental reconciliation. Chapter III gives an overview of
methodological approaches used in the analysis of trade and environmental problems.
Chapter IV presents the political model of international public goods problem - Gini Ratio
Equilibrium. Chapter V demonstrates the application of this model with respect to the global
warming case. Chapter VI concludes the study.
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CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES:
RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section the background of the
postwar environmental movement is reviewed. Three trends are identified. In the second
section the debate over the interaction of trade and the environment is analyzed. It discusses
the two-way effects of trade and the environment. The final section discusses the policy
aspects, including trade instruments, trading markets, technology, and standards that are
related to trade and environmental issues.
The Postwar Environmental Movement
After the Second World War, the economies of the world became increasingly
interdependent and environmental problems together with related political and
social-economic issues became more explicit in the international arena. In 1949, the United
Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources
(UNSCCUR) was held at Lake Success in New York (Dixey 1949, Nicholson 1972). This
conference was devoted solely to the exchange of ideas and experiences on that matter
among engineers, resource technicians, economists and other experts in related fields, and
was a major landmark in the rise of the international environmental movement (Nash 1973,
Lowe 1983). Unfortunately, the remarkable breadth and foresight of its agenda was ignored
for two decades, until the late 1960s when environmental "crises" occurred in the United
States, Canada, Japan, and most countries of western Europe. This led to the 1968
5

Biosphere Conference and the 1972 Stockholm Conference.
The "crisis" of the late 1960s and early 1970s was a product of political,
social-economic and environmental problems in the aftermath of World War II. One of the
triggers of the explosion in public concern about the environment is believed to be with a
view of the Earth from outer space, made possible by the 1960s' space technology, together
with the help by the mass media and a few rather dismal exercises in futurology. These
predicted global disaster in the shockingly near future unless drastic remedial actions were
undertaken immediately - and even then, things did not look too good (Walter 1975). But
the causes and evolution of the crisis were very complex. Wilson (1971) and McCormick
(1989), among others, have examined the trends and their causes of the post-war
environmental movement. Three trends are highlighted below, drawing mainly on
McCormick (1989).
The first trend of the post-war environmental movement can be labeled
neo-Malthusism. The food crisis and environmental destruction caused by WWII made the
Malthusian spirit live. Food security and population growth became one of the immediate
concerns, even before the end of WWII. For example, concerns about the relationship
between hunger, population and land were reflected in the book The World's Hunger
(Pearson & Harper 1945). Concerns about the relationship between population growth and
resource depletion were then revived in two influential books published in the United States
in 1948: Our Plundered Planet by Fairfield Osborn and Road to Survival by William Vogt.
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Prompted partly by the memory of the Dust Bowl during the mid-1930s and partly
by the wartime shortage of food and wood, and quoting numerous examples from the
history of human misuse of the land, Osborn (1948) argued that the story of forests,
grasslands, wildlife, and water resources in the United States in the previous century had
been the most violent and most destructive of any written in the long history of civilization.
He bemoaned the fact that few people were aware of the processes of mounting destruction
being inflicted on natural resources. Action by government, in the final analysis, is based
mainly on the point of view of people. The fact that the majority of the population of the
U.S. live in cities and towns results inevitably in detachment from the land and apathy as to
how resources are treated. Osborn insisted that international discord could be traced to
diminishing productive lands and increasing population pressures and warned: “The tide of
the earth's population is rising, the reservoir of the earth's living resources is falling ... .
There is only one solution: Man must recognize the necessity of co-operation with
nature”(Osborn 1948, p. 201).
In Road to Survival , which anticipated the prophets of doom of the 1960s, Vogt
(1948) argued that the United States was over-populated, self-indulgent, wasteful of natural
resources and doomed to extinction. He saw a negative effect of the market on land. Vogt
asserted that the methods of free competition and the application of the profit motive had
been disastrous to the land; land is managed on the basis of so-called economic laws and in
very general disregard of the physical and biological laws to which it is subject. Man
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assumes that what has been good for industry must necessarily be good for the land. He
argued that this may prove to be one of the most expensive mistakes in history (Vogt 1948).
Surveying the effects of an imbalance between human demands and the carrying capacity
of land on five continents, Vogt concluded that man had moved to an untenable position by
protracted and wholesale violation of certain natural laws; to re-establish himself man needs
only to bring his behavior into conformity with natural limitations.
The concern about increasing population pressure on land was echoed at the FAO's
conference on land use in Asia and the Far East, held in Ceylon in 1951. Population was at
the core of the debate, and shifting cultivation was blamed for the reduction of soil fertility,
the clearance of vegetation, flooding, soil erosion, river siltation, and reductions of water
supplies (Ingham 1963). In the United States, Vogt's contention that the country was
running out of resources was accepted by a government commission, resulting in the
foundation of Resources for the Future (RFF), set up with a large grant from the Ford
Foundation, which charged RFF with the task of devising a rational plan for resource
consumption (Fox 1981).
Osborn published another book in 1953: The Limits of the Earth, in which he argued
that only when resources have proven adequate, not only to meet the basic needs of peoples
but also to support their economies, have nations and cultures flourished. The so-called
'great periods' of history are intimately identified with this favorable relationship. Lacking
it, apparently indestructible empires have dissolved (Osborn 1953). He traced the links
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between environmental destruction and social decay in Greece and Rome, which raised the
question of how the earth could continue meeting the needs of a rapidly growing population.
In 1954, the Hugh Moore Fund issued a pamphlet, which first used the terms "the
population bomb" and "population explosion". Annual editions of the pamphlet were issued
and widely distributed, totaling over two million copies (Ehrlich 1968).
These warnings about natural resources and population growth were widely read,
but their impact was dampened by the fact that they came just as the United States reached
the end of two decades of enforced austerity and embarked on a decade of unparalleled
prosperity and consumption. Good weather produced repeated bumper harvests, incomes
rose, and consumer spending and energy consumption grew. In such a climate, predictions
of doom seemed premature, and talk of resource shortages irrelevant (McCormick 1989).
Nevertheless, the influence of Osborn's and Vogt's assessments were far-reaching. With the
publishing of The Population Bomb (Ehrlich 1968) and "The Tragedy of The Commons"
(Hardin 1968), the Malthusian spirit was revitalized. Overpopulation and resource depletion
became two well-known topics in the environmental movement after 1970.
The second trend that can be discerned from the post-war environment movement
is conservationism and preservationism. This may be considered a reflection on the
environmental destruction by the war and the change of values and attitudes toward
internationalism. As early as 1946, the American representative at the UN proposed that a
scientific conference be held in the United States to look at conservation in light of the
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wartime strain on natural resources and their importance to postwar reconstruction. This
proposed conference turned out to be the UNSCCUR held in 1949, as mentioned earlier.
Another effort was the establishment of the International Union for the protection of Nature
(IUPN). With a provisional IUPN initiative in 1947 and its Constitutive Act signed in 1948,
the goal of IUPN was to promote the preservation of wildlife and the natural environment,
through promoting scientific research, education, legislation, and public knowledge of the
issues. The IUPN also held a conference, titled "The International Technical Conference on
the Protection of Nature” (ITC), at the same time as UNSCCUR in 1949 (Buttikofer 1947,
UNESCO 1949, 1950).
It is worth noting two books, which were considered to influence the conservation
and preservation movement, at its early stage. The first was Leopold's Sand County
Almanac, published in 1949. It called for a new land ethic based on the belief that man was
not a conqueror of the land-community but a member and citizen of it; a weakness of
conservation based on economic notions was that it ignored the elements in the
land-community that lacked commercial value, but were essential to its healthy functioning.
He warned of the inadequacy of land conservation as a purely economic question, arguing
that people abused land because they regarded it as a commodity belonging to them. When
they see land as a commodity to which they belong, they might begin to use it with love and
respect (Leopold 1949). The second book was Carson's (1962) Silent Spring. In this book
Carson warned people of the biological consequences of using chemicals such as DDT,
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which was banned later, as pesticides in agriculture.
A third trend of the postwar environmental movement was related to the nuclear
arms race, which began in two countries in the 1940s and expanded to five countries in the
1960s. A widespread international concern was the radioactive fallout from the aboveground
testing of nuclear weapons. This can be a fatal type of atmospheric pollution. "Nuclear
winter" is really an alarming phrase. Fortunately, this race came to an end in 1980 (Soroos
1998).
Interaction of Trade and the Environment
Until the mid-1980s debates over the relationships of the environment and
international trade were centered on the effects of environmental policies on trade, and then
shifted to the effects of trade policies on the environment. As a natural development of the
postwar environmental movement, concerns about the effects of environmental policies on
international trade began to emerge in the early 1970s. In contrast to those salient and
important reasons for trying to achieve international monitoring and information exchange
and for working toward agreements on the management of substances actually or potentially
deleterious to both regional and global natural environment, concerns about effects of
environmental controls on trade were considered a more subtle aspect. This results from
demands (or preferences) for goods produced in one country on the part of citizens in
another, and vice versa. International trade, through market exchanges, is an expression of
those preferences (d'Arge and Kneese 1972). But this does not mean that the effects of
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environmental policies on trade can be ignored. Furthermore, as tariffs and, to some degree,
non-tariff barriers exhibited a downward trend in the previous decade, there was a possibility
that domestic environmental protection would become a rationalization for greater
protection. Thus d'Arge and Kneese (1972) dealt rigorously and empirically with these
international aspects of domestic environmental policies and demonstrated that such a
rationalization cannot be substantiated on the basis of either long-term impacts on
comparative advantage and efficiency or on likely short-term impacts on balance of
payments and domestic incomes for selected countries.
Environmental Impacts on Trade
Environmental policies may affect the volume, composition, balance, direction, and
terms of international trade, industrial location, transportation costs, and a variety of related
variables, including national policy responses. Walter (1975) in his book, International
Economics of Pollution, attempted to delineate the dimensions of the problem in an
integrated way. In particular, noting that environmental management as a social priority is
subject to public policy and potentially can absorb significant amounts of real resources, he
treated it as a shock to the system of growing interdependent world economies. He then
identified the principal links between environmental and economic interdependence, which
include short-term competitive effects, balance-of-trade effects, comparative advantage
effects, factor-movement effects, environmental-policy repercussions, international
economic policy effects, transfrontier pollution, institutions, and international development.
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A related book edited by Walter (1976), and entitled Studies in International
Environmental Economics, was a product of an international symposium held in New York
City in 1975. The participants of the symposium probed each of these dimensions in
considerable depth and provided both new conceptual insights and new empirical findings.
Especially, these studies were organized under three dimensions: the competitive dimension,
the policy dimension, and the transnational dimension. Most studies on trade and
environmental issues since then have more or less fallen into these dimensions.
Here, however, the issues are examined from a different point of view in recognizing
the important difference between national and international perspectives. It discusses only
the two-way effects and leave the policy-response issue to next section.
From a national perspective, the effects of environmental policies on trade can be
classified into two related but distinct aspects: the short-run competitive effects and the
long-run comparative advantage effects.
The short-run competitive effects are referred to as the more immediate impacts of
environmental management on costs of production, product prices and, hence, the
international competitiveness, terms of trade, and balance of trade. A general presumption
seems to be that domestic environmental control is 'bad' for the international economic
relations of a country, in that it is disadvantageous for the competitive position of domestic
goods in export markets and simultaneously erodes the competitive position of domestic
producers who have to compete with imports for the home market. As environmental
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control pushes up domestic prices relative to foreign prices, so the argument goes, the
volume of exports is bound to drop even as the volume of imports is bound to rise, and this
will represent an adverse influence on the nation's balance of trade and balance of payments
(Walter 1975). This was and still may be an important concern for producers of both exportand import-competing industries. Many studies had been conducted to analyze these
short-term effects in theory or by empirical tests during the 1970s-80s (Brashares 1971,
d'Arge 1971, Council on Environmental Quality et al. 1972, Klotz 1972, Magee and Ford
1972, Evans 1973, Walter 1973, Mutti and Richardson 1977, Lake et al. 1979, Siebert et
al. 1980, Portney 1981, Pasurka 1984, Robison 1985, Baumol and Oates 1988, Merrifield
1988, Robison 1988). Theoretical and empirical results from these studies indicate the
typical types of variation in impacts likely to occur across industries. However, the overall
empirical results showed that the average impact on prices was modest and that a country
did not lose its competitive position because of its strict environmental policies.
By affecting factor costs and product prices, environmental controls also induce
industrial structural adjustments, promote relocations of productive factors, and, thus,
affect international specialization and trade patterns. These induced effects are referred to
as the long-run comparative advantage effects. It is argued that environmental control costs
discourage specialization in and export of those commodities which are relatively
pollution-intensive in their production (d'Arge and Kneese 1972, Koo 1974, Siebert 1974,
Walter 1974, 1975, Pethig 1976, Siebert 1977, Asako 1979, Siebert et al. 1980, McGuire
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1982, Baumol and Oates 1988). Countries with strict environmental policies will lose their
comparative advantage in producing these commodities while countries with loose
environmental policies gain the advantage. This gave rise to concerns about the international
relocation of industries. In particular, there was a concern that developed countries with
their strict environmental controls will push out their pollution-intensive industries, while
developing countries with their relaxed environmental policies will become the "havens"
attracting these "dirty" industries; this is often mentioned in literature as the
"industrial-flight"/"pollution-haven" hypotheses (Walter 1975, Walter and Ugelow 1979,
Walter 1982, Leonard 1988). However, Bowen (1983), Leamer (1984), and Bowen and
Leamer (1987), among others, conducted empirical tests and showed no evidence
supporting these hypotheses. For a review of these short-term and long term effects, see
Dean (1992) and Anderson (1997).
Trade Impacts on the Environment
As mentioned earlier, it was with international trade that the agricultural and
industrial revolutions sowed the seeds of the global environmental problem. Unlike the
concern about the effects of environmental policies on trade, where the empirical evidence
was often weak, the impacts of trade on the environment are more obvious. In the absence
of environmental regulation, freer trade may lead faster depletion of natural resources and
more pollution of the environment. Based on whether the export industries are driven by
primary commodities or manufactured goods, two cases can be distinguished. First, for

15

those countries which take primary commodity exports as their "growth engine", trade may
result in damages to their natural resource bases. Deforestation, overgrazing, over mining,
and over fishing were real problems that occurred in developing countries during the
decades of the 1960s to 1980s. The tropical timber trade is an example that demonstrates
many of the pitfalls of natural resource-based exports (French 1993). Second, for those
countries which depend on the export of manufactured goods, environmental issues are
mainly associated with air pollution, water pollution, and disposal of hazardous wastes. In
addition, manufacturing industries often cause transboundary pollution, a greater concern
for neighboring countries. Of course, trade policies can affect environmental quality in more
subtle ways. Exchange rate reform, for instance, may cause a change in terms of trade and
have an impact through market mechanisms on the environment where exporting industries
are located.
It should be emphasized that, although these environmental problems may to some
extent be treated as national issues and solved domestically, they are in fact matters of
international interest and concern and require international cooperation. Transboundary
pollution, for instance, has been an important issue of international concern since the 1970s
(OECD 1974). Issues such as trade of hazardous wastes, ozone layer depletion, global
climate changes, endangered species, and environmentally sustainable development are really
the international interests that highlighted the revitalization of environmentalism in late
1980s and the resurge of debates over trade and the environment in early 1990s (Holtz
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1989, Sankey 1989, Barbier et al. 1990, Delphos 1992, Brown 1993, Mahoney 1993,
Scheraga 1994, Heyes and Liston-Heyes 1995, Ketting 1995, Parson and Greene 1995,
Schlagenhof 1995, Trainer 1995, Xepapadeas 1995, Lessen and Flavin 1996, Murota and
Ito 1996, Byrne 1997, Schneider and Wellisch 1997, Ott 1998, Lanchbery 1998, Soroos
1998). It is also important to realize that the debates over trade and environmental issues
can not be characterized as simply the interaction between trade and the environment, or a
battle between free trade enthusiasts and environmentalists. The essential nature of these
debates lies in the difficulties which involve international political relations, such as
sovereignty issues and North-South relations. Furthermore, with growing regional economic
integration, e.g., NAFTA, EU, the problems become more complicated (Ritchie 1991,
Ranger 1992, Rowbotham 1993, Mello 1994, Runge 1994). A celebrated example is the
trade of hazardous wastes. In the early 1980s developing countries had expressed concern
at what they perceived as an increasing trend on the part of industries and firms to export
to Third World countries products whose domestic sale was either banned or severely
restricted for reasons of health, safety or environmental protection. But despite the concern,
the trade continued without regulation until the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes came into effect in 1992. The Basel
Convention was endorsed by the international community in 1989. It regulates this trade by
requiring exporters to notify the recipient nation of a shipment and to receive approval for
it before proceeding (Sankey 1989).
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Reconciliation of Trade and the Environment
With the above discussion, we now turn to the question of how to reconcile trade
and the environment, solutions to the problems. To avoid fear of complicating already
complicated issues, the differences between a national perspective and a global perspective
are distinguished, from which a solution or policy response is designed. The significance of
this distinction should not be ignored. A policy designed from a national perspective
concerns the "national interest" and it could maximize national economic efficiency at the
expense of trading partners. This is myopic and actually a suicidal policy in the long run. On
the other hand, a policy from a global perspective will concern the "international or global
interest" and it pursues Pareto optimal solutions. From this point of view, it becomes clear
that, as a rule, if the repercussions on trade are due to domestic environmental management,
a policy response, if necessary, should be designed from a national perspective; if the
repercussion is due to international environmental practices, the solution should be
formulated from an international or global perspective. In the 1970s, unilateral action was
considered an alternative to move matters in the right direction (Baumol 1976). But the
situation is quite different with today's issues and this alternative is not generally
recommended. Furthermore, McGee (1995) argued that any unilateral approach will violate
human rights. Emphasizing morality, he concluded that the only trade policy that does not
violate human rights is a policy of total and unilateral free trade.
Unfortunately, the distinction between these two perspectives is not so obvious.
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Debates over trade and environmental issues usually arise out of ignorance of this
distinction. Indeed, with the rapid growth of international trade and nations becoming
increasingly interdependent, it is no longer possible for a government to formulate its
national polices without considering activities in the rest of the world. The design and
implementation of a domestic environmental measure is inevitably shadowed by the fact that
a nation that takes such environmental measures is part of the economy of the world. This
can cause two kinds of concerns. The first concern is about the competitive consequences
of domestic environmental measures. The second concern is about the relatively low
environmental standards in other countries. With regard to the first concern, no businessman
and politician is likely to ignore either the short-run or long-run effects as described above.
The businesses and the unions then ally with environmentalists to loudly voice this concern,
and to recommend tariff and no-tariff barriers as policy responses to be used for the
adjustment to environmental costs and to the neutralization of such impacts (Bhagwati
1993). Ironically, the recommended trade barriers are usually the same barriers that GATT
has been trying to eliminate. Are these new trade barriers justified? As long as they are
designed for a genuine domestic environmental objective and no conflict with GATT rules,
the answer may be yes. For what is involved is simply an effort to equate domestic social
and private costs (d'Arge and Kneese 1972). This is the case where policies are designed to
reconcile trade and the environment from a national perspective. It is often referred to as the
international dimension of domestic environmental policies. There is a considerable literature
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on this (e.g., Walter 1975, Siebert 1980, Cropper and Oates 1992, Chichilnisky 1994,
Copeland and Taylor 1995) and not much need for debate about it. However, it may be
helpful to mention the following: (1) Since there is little evidence supporting the effects of
domestic environment control on competitive position or trade patterns, these trade barriers
seem needless; (2) From standard economic theory, it is well known that these tariff and
non-tariff barriers are, at best, the second best policy (Johnson 1958).
With regard to the second set of concerns, which is a major sentiment of the revitalization of new environmentalism in the late 1980s and the resurge of trade-environment
debates in the early 1990s, environmentalists are on their own in many ways. They
recommend use of trade sanctions to induce or coerce other countries to adopt the same
environmental standards as their own domestic standards. The justification for this is based
on, among other things, their own ethical preferences (Baghwati 1993) and the efficiency
argument (Daly 1993). The former includes such issues as bio-diversity, amenity, and other
ecological notions; the latter refers to countries with low environmental standards being
inefficient because environmental costs are not internalized; thus a domestic policy should
be used to 'protect' against the inefficiencies. It should be pointed out that there is nothing
wrong with this second kind of concern per se. The problem is that the policy
recommendations are based on the "national" perspective. This is quite clear if we recall the
rule described above. That is, environmentalists are trying to use a policy designed from a
national perspective to deal with the repercussions due to international environmental
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practices, to which the second concern belongs. A correct policy response should be
formulated from the international or global perspective, which is what GATT strikes for.
In addition to traditional trade policies, other approaches are also recommended,
such as pollution trading markets and the harmonization of domestic laws and GATT/WTO
regulations. There is a considerable literature on the potential international emission trading
markets (Spellman 1989, Bohm 1992, Devlin and Grafton 1994, Howe 1994, Klaassen et
al. 1994, Copeland and Taylor 1995, Rubin 1996, Matsuo 1998, Zhang 1998). It should be
noted that this emission-trading system has been welcome and used experimentally for
domestic pollution control in the United States (Pavetto and Bae 1991, van Dyke 1991,
Baker 1993, Burkhart 1993, Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore 1994, Muller and Mestelman
1994, Webster 1994, Lewis et al. 1995, Tietenberg 1995, Burtraw 1996, Fahrer 1996). We
will discuss it in a later chapter. The other approach - harmonization (see Foy 1992 and
Patterson 1992) - is motivated by trade disputes involved with political sovereignty issues,
such as the dolphin-tuna case, a well known trade dispute between the U.S. and Mexico
(see, for example, Esty 1994). Recalling, again, the rule described above, it also becomes
clear that this approach is not correct since domestic laws are designed from a national
perspective while GATT/WTO regulations are designed from an international perspective.
Recognizing the conflict between domestic laws and international laws, Lang (1986) argued
that the solution should be of preventive cooperation rather than harmonization.
Another solution is to establish an international tax system, in particular a carbon tax
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system (Hoel 1991, Pearce and Barbier 1991, Whalley and Wigle 1991, Hoel 1992, Smith
1992, Pluge 1997). Taxes have been explored by economists as an effective instrument for
handling environmental externalities at least since Pigou's pioneering work (Pigou 1920).
However, this approach is more difficult to implement than an emissions trading system
since it needs a powerful international government to collect the tax, and as argued in the
case of the trading system, no such a government exists and it is impossible to set up one,
at least at this time.
There are two other approaches which should be emphasized in regard to the global
environmental problems. One is technology, including physical devices and biological
methods. The other is organizations and partnerships. These approaches have been
substantially discussed in the business literature but, unfortunately, have drawn little
attention in academic debates over trade and environmental issues. The organization and
partnership approach is based on private codes of environmental management practices.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, these private codes have emerged as a major force
in corporate environmental programs and play an important role in international markets.
Two examples are the Responsible Care and ISO 14000. Responsible Care is an industry
wide program for health and environmental purposes. The U.S. Chemical Manufacturers
Association's (CMA) Responsible Care program was created in 1987, in the wake of the
Union Carbide accidents at Bhopal, India in 1984 and Institute, West Virginia in 1985, when
public distrust of the chemical industry was strong. It is to be noted that in creating
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Responsible Care, U.S. chemical executives relied heavily on the Canadian Responsible Care
program instituted several years earlier. Responsible Care-type initiatives now exist in
approximately 30 countries in addition to US and Canada (Heller 1991, Layton 1991,
Hunter 1992, Tattum and Plishner 1992, Popoff 1993, Reisch 1994, Nash and Ehrenfld
1996).
ISO 14000 is the international environmental management standard, initiated in 1992
and first drafted in 1995, by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), an
“industry-driven" organization formed in 1946 and headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.
ISO 14000 loosely refers to a series of voluntary standards to check whether a company has
an effective environment management system in place. The standards seek to harmonize
practices in several areas, including environmental management, auditing, performance
evaluation, labeling, and life-cycle analysis. The standard directs a firm to set up a procedure
and identify activities, products, and services that it can control or influence so as to
determine which have or can have significant impacts on the environment. ISO 14000, like
ISO 9000 (quality management) before it, is expected to be accepted and become the
guidelines in doing business in international markets. This should greatly reduce the global
environmental concerns (e.g, Blau 1995, Barnes 1996, Pratt 1997).
Similar to these industrial-driven practices are two organizations which work to set
up standards for forestry and agriculture. They are the specific environmental labeling
programs - one for timber products, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) located in
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Oaxaca, Mexico, and the other for organic agricultural products, the International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) in Tholey-Thelay, Germany (Duley
et al. 1997).
Technology, an important aspect that can not be overemphasized in modern society,
while being the cause of most environmental problems, is often considered to be the ultimate
cure for such problems. Two points need to be mentioned here. The first is the potential for
technology. Historically, as far as the environment is concerned, man often failed to
recognize the potentials of technology. Otherwise, Malthus would not have been so
pessimistic, and there would not have been so many ominous warnings from time to time
that dooms day was coming. To be sure, it is technological progress that shaped modern
civilizations. Because of improved environmental technologies in recent years, the Earth has
tended to become relatively cleaner rather than dirtier, although serious environmental
problems, created by misuse of technologies, still exist. Unfortunately, little attention had
been paid to environmental technology. In the twentieth century, large parts of which were
preoccupied by the two wars and the cold war, research efforts were often misdirected, with
inadequate attention given to environmental concerns. As more efforts are devoted to
research and development of environmental technologies, conflicts between trade and the
environment can be reduced or eliminated. The second point that needs to be mentioned
here is the utilization of technology. As pointed out earlier, it is technological progress and
population growth that increase human activities and, thus, the unfavorable environmental
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consequences. Indeed, although the advance of modern civilization has been overly
dependent on technological progress, man has been damaging his environment for centuries
by the utilization of technologies. However, the fault for these environmental damages lies
with man himself rather than the tools he uses. That is, technology could be the cure rather
than the cause. The important thing is how to develop and use it in a constructive way. This
is indeed a challenge to higher education systems. A perspective on the roles and prospects
of the university in promoting sustainable development and environmental protection was
offered by Lemons (1995).
Before ending this chapter, some new issues arising out of the trade-environmental
debates need to be mentioned. These include environmental ethics, financial constraints and
welfare effects of environmental problems (see, for examples, Johnson 1979, Cornia et al.
1988, McAfee 1991, Shiling 1992, Webster 1994, Bhagwati 1995, Slade 1996, Fankhauser
et al. 1997, Schneider and Wellisch 1997). These problems, for better or worse, are all
complicated by the uncertainty of the global environment (such as the global warming case
discussed in a later chapter). One thing can be sure is that, regardless of economic or
ecological origin, they are really global issues and political in nature. Therefore, policy
responses should be designed from a global perspective, as just discussed above.
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CHAPTER III
OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In this chapter, the methodological approaches, which are employed in the analysis
of trade-environmental issues, are briefly reviewed. International trade and environmental
economics are traditionally two separate areas, and each has a huge and rapidly growing
literature. This literature is so broad that it is difficult, if not impossible, to cover it
extensively. For this reason, the overview here is intended to give a guideline only. This is
done by categorizing the methodological approaches into two groups - international trade
approaches and environmental economics approaches - and then covering some of the
studies under each group. No detailed examinations are made. Also, it should be noted that
many excellent articles are not included here. Nevertheless, this overview provides a broad
range of interesting references with respect to the methodological approaches used.
International Trade Approaches
By international trade approaches we mean theoretical or empirical analyses based
on the frameworks of partial or general equilibrium models which are oriented toward the
theories of international trade and commercial policy, and those studies related to models
derived from this framework. Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage and the
Hechscher-Ohlin theory of factor endowments are examples of general equilibrium models
(for a discussion of Ricardo’s theory and the Hechscher-Ohlin theory, see Jones and Neary
1984). Partial equilibrium models, unlike general equilibrium models which analyze all the
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variables involved, focus on change in some product or factor by holding other things
constant. In both partial and general equilibrium models, the environment may be treated as
a commodity or as a factor input and thence as the determinant of trade, and its impacts on
trade, or vice versa, are addressed theoretically or tested empirically. Most studies done in
recent decades use these trade models (see the above debates over interaction of trade and
the environment). Recent works using general equilibrium or computable general
equilibrium models include Despotakis and Fisher (1988), Merrifield (1988), Copeland
(1994), Hoel (1994), Lopez (1994), Boyd et al. (1995), Goulder (1995), and Elbasha and
Roe (1996). A review of literature on these traditional analyses of trade and environmental
issues can be found in van Beers and van den Bergh (1996).
It is to be noted that there have been controversies over the empirical relevance of
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory since the pioneering work of Leontief (1953), who used the
input-output analysis to show that the empirical result contradicted with the HeckscherOhlin theorem, a phenomena later called the “Leontief’s Paradox” (see a recent survey on
evidence of trade theory - Leamer and Levinsohn 1995). Leontief’s’s work sparked a search
of great breadth and intensity for a theory that could explain it. The factor-content version
of Heckscher-Ohlin theorem was thus developed. However, as Deardorff (1982) pointed
out, the work of Harkness (1978) who used the factor-content version of the HeckscherOhlin theorem as the motivation for a regression equation relating commodity trade to
factor intensities also gave rise to criticism by Anderson (1981) and Leamer and Bowen
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(1981). On the other hand, in the discussion of trade and environmental issues, empirical
results are usually accepted without questioning the approaches employed in those studies.
It should be kept in mind that there are two sets of assumptions involved in the test of
Heckscher-Ohlin theories: (1) those implicitly or explicitly embodied in the trade theory in
question and (2) those required by the specific model. In practice, neither are easily satisfied,
especially the first one. In view of this, a more modest way may be to test relevant
econometric models instead of trade theories. Some commodity models (see, for example,
Labys 1973) may provide a good opportunity to introduce environmental variables for
empirical testing.
An important change in the trade literature since 1980s has been a departure from
considering perfect markets to analyzing imperfect markets. These studies focus on strategic
trade policies, which are fundamentally the application of non-cooperative game theory and
therefore use the Nash equilibrium, first defined by Nash (1950), as the central equilibrium
concept. The works of Kennedy (1994), Welsch (1994), Amacher and Malik (1996), Bac
(1996), Tahvonen (1996), and Ulph (1996) are examples using non-cooperative game
theory for trade and environmental issues. Ulph’s (1994) survey article covered both
traditional and strategic models in trade and the environment. A general reference on
strategic trade policy is Brander (1995).
Another important trend within international trade approaches is the use of political
economy models. Rodrik (1995) gave an excellent survey of this approach. A considerable
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literature exists on this and several surveys have been made of the empirical literature on the
political economy of trade policy (Anderson and Baldwin 1987, Marks and McArthur 1990,
Ray 1990). Fredriksson's (1997) work is an example using this approach to study trade and
environmental issues. Notice that in these models, the demand side of the political market
is differing interests of the individuals or lobbying groups, while the supply side is the
government. This seems to be a better way to model trade and environmental issues since
it is from conflicts among those different "interest" groups that the issues arise. It should be
pointed out, however, that in these models the government may maximize its own interest
rather than the welfare of the society.
Environmental Economics Approaches
The environmental economics approaches refer to those models that are more
oriented toward the theories of environmental and natural resource economics, especially
those applying game theory and optimal control theory to the analysis of trade and
environmental issues. Models of game theory include cooperative equilibrium and noncooperative equilibrium. The works of Chander and Tulkens (1997) and Eyckmans (1997)
are examples of applying cooperative equilibrium models to global environmental problems.
The non-cooperative game is mentioned in the last section. These applications represent a
recent trend in studies of trade and environmental issues.
It may be helpful to mention the difference between traditional economic theory and
game theory: the former is the study of optimal decision making by a single agent - a
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consumer, a firm, or a social planner; while the latter is the study of interacting decision
makers (Varian 1992). Thus, traditional economic models are usually limited to the national
perspective of trade and environmental issues, while game theory is called for the
international perspective of the issues. For this reason, the game theoretic approach is
employed in the present study to address global environmental concerns. This approach will
be elaborated in next chapter.
It is also noteworthy that environmental issues have been traditionally treated as
externalities. One of the familiar solutions to these externalities, as mentioned in last chapter,
is Pigouvian taxation. An implicit assumption in this solution is the existence of a powerful
government to enforce such a tax. When such a government does not exist, or when
governmental taxation is not satisfied, alternatives are proposed. One is the market
approach, proposed by Coase (1960). In the case of air pollution, this approach is translated
into the emissions trading system. There is a substantial body of literature on it, as
mentioned previously. However, this trading system, as argued in the next chapter, is
infeasible at the international level.
Another approach is to treat environmental issues as public goods (or public bads)
and then study the financing mechanisms. In this way, an environmental control problem
becomes a problem of public goods provision - the problem of how to provide the public
good efficiently and share the cost fairly. This is a central issue of welfare economics. A
considerable body of literature exists in this area (see, for example, Moulin 1987). The
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classical solution to the public good problem is the Lindahl equilibrium (Lindahl 1919). In
recent decades, this problem is usually formulated in game theory, with the players supposed
to share the cost of the public good, and new equilibrium concepts have been established
for the cost-sharing game. One of the concepts receiving considerable theoretical attention
is the ratio equilibrium (Kaneko 1977). This equilibrium concept is used in a study of
transboundary pollution problem by Eyckmans (1997) and will be used in the present study.
Finally, optimal control methods have been used extensively in natural resource
literature. The difference between these approaches and international trade approaches, as
discussed above, is that the former treats natural resources as state variables (see, for
example, Phipps 1984), while the latter treats them as primary inputs2. It is worth noting that
a new approach, called a genetic game, which combines game theory and a genetic
algorithm, recently emerged in the trade-environmental literature (Ozyildirim 1996, Alemdar
and Ozyildirim 1997). The genetic algorithm (GA) was developed by Holland (1970, 1975)
in a study of adaptive processes of natural and artificial systems. Holland viewed adaptation
as a process of search in high dimensional and highly nonlinear space, and designed this
computing procedure for numerical optimization by abstracting from the genetic mechanism.
In this sense GA can be considered a variant of mathematical programming combined with
genetic evolutionary theory. To the extent that economic activities are fraught with learning
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Kemp and Long (1984) were able to use the optimal control technique to describe the
role of natural resources in trade models. But trade models developed in this way do not
belong to the orthodox theory intended in last section.
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and doing, this is a very promising approach. Arifovic (1994, 1996) applied GA to studies
of the cobweb model and the behavior of exchange rates.
To leave this chapter, it is helpful to point out that although no independent theories
for the analysis of the entwined trade and environmental issues exist, these can be fit into
either the theory of international trade or the theory of environmental economics. One need
not invent a "new" theory. Two cases must be distinguished, however. The first arises out
of the concern about the trade repercussions of the domestic environmental management or
the effects of trade policies on domestic environment. The second concerns the effects of
trade liberalization on the international environment. The first case can be fit into the trade
theory, and the second into the theory of environmental economics. The difficulty in the
latter case is that the environment is traditionally defined within a national or regional
boundary. So when the theory is applied to an international situation, the perspective needs
to be changed from national to international, which has often been forgotten in
trade-environmental debates.
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CHAPTER IV
A POLITICAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM:
A GINI RATIO EQUILIBRIUM

In this chapter, a political model of the international public goods problem is
presented. Specifically, transboundary pollution problems resulting from international trade
are treated as pure public goods (actually public bads) in the world economy and
cooperative solutions sought to the problem. Agreements, decentralization, and justice are
three modes of cooperation. A political solution is proposed which combines the virtues of
all the three modes; i.e., decentralization in financing, distributive justice on public
expenditure, and binding agreement on cost-share progressivity with respect to the initial
endowment. In particular, with respect to Samuelson’s problem in optimal provision of
public goods, we design a simple mechanism to implement the proposed solution.
General Considerations
In seeking a cooperative solution to transboundary pollution, the following
considerations must be addressed: efficiency, cooperation modes, and implementability.
In his book titled Cooperative Microeconomics, Moulin (1995) points out that
cooperation in the economic tradition is mutual assistance between egoists. He gives the
archetypical example of Rousseau’s staghunt: by coordinating their efforts, the two hunters
more than double the returns of one isolated hunter; therefore each hunter can receive a
positive profit from cooperation. Thus, cooperation is not only positive, in the sense that the
behavior of the egoists is predicted, but also normative, in the sense that the rational pursuit
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of one’s interests is justified.
The concept of efficiency in economic theory follows logically from this view of
cooperation. An outcome x is efficient if, with respect to the concerned agents, there does
not exist another outcome y that leaves everyone at least as well off as x and would make
at least one agent better off than x. This is a standard definition of efficiency, which
generally is referred to as Pareto optimality; we will use the latter term when the welfare
issue is considered with respect to the cooperation of the entire society. A formal definition
of Pareto efficiency will given in next section.
In considering the efficiency of dealing with pollution problems, it may be better to
refer to Coase’s (1960) celebrated paper -- “The Problem of Social Cost”. In this paper,
Ronald H. Coase provides the classical statement of the efficiency postulate about rational
agents; they will cooperate if by doing so they both benefit. It is to be noted that Coase’s
concept of efficiency or optimality differs from that of traditional welfare economics where
a world of zero organizational costs is the reference point. In other words, Coase adopted
a total effect approach emphasizing transaction costs, which sometimes exceed the gains
from cooperation.
This raises the question of how to cooperate. In some simple cases, which involve
only a few agents who have complete knowledge of the cooperative opportunities,
cooperation occurs through direct bargains among all of the participants. For example, in
the staghunt story, the two hunters could make a face-to-face bargain of how to hunt
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together and how to share the outcome. However, in most cases in a market economy,
cooperation usually involves a large number of producers and consumers, and a direct
bargain among all of the participants is impossible. Economists have argued that a price
signal is an efficient decentralized device for cooperative organization of markets. Taking
the price as given, each agent acts selfishly by making his buying and selling decisions. The
results of these selfish decisions is, oddly enough, an optimal outcome. This is Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand” theorem. Can this “invisible hand” also be a cooperative solution
to pollution problems, especially for global environmental issues? The answer is yes & no.
According to Coase (1960), once the property right is established, those actions of
business firms which have harmful effects on others can be solved through market
transactions, and the efficient outcome is independent of the property right. This is the
famous Coase theorem. The pollution permit market in the United States can be viewed as
the application of this theorem. However, the Coase theorem is not the whole story, since
it assumes that market transactions are costless. The question is whether the permit system
is efficient when transaction costs are taken into account? We are not going to examine the
permit system in the United States, but we will point out that the permit system is unlikely
to be a feasible solution to global environmental problems for the following reasons.
First, it is very costly to set up a pollution permit market, especially for an
international pollution permit market. Coase (1960) argued that the pricing system is an
efficient way to solve the pollution damage problem only if the market transaction is
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costless. “In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked
without cost” (Coase 1960, p.15). Therefore, even if it is possible to establish a pollution
permit system, the organizational costs of the system may exceed the gains from the
cooperative market.
Second, if an efficient pollution permit market can be established for a domestic
economy, it is because there are a powerful government and sound institutions in this society
to enforce it. One can not design an efficient market without considering the context of the
society. A pollution permit market may be efficient in one country, but not in another. The
world economy is much more complicated than a domestic economy since it involves
different national interests, laws, cultures, ethics, etc. Currently, a powerful international
government or institution to enforce an efficient market does not exist. Thus, in a domestic
economy, the undesirable distributional effect resulting from an efficient market, if any, may
be solved by government regulations and other domestic institutions; while in the world
economy, this can not be done. Given the fact that it is a common practice for governments
of different countries and regions to use their own strategic trade policies in international
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markets, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to design an efficient pollution
permit market for the world economy.
As an alternative to market transactions, the firm may be a better way to organize
production and to internalize externalities. Within the firm individual bargains between the
various operating factors of production are limited and an administrative decision is
substituted for a market transaction (Coase 1960). Indeed, as the world economy becomes
more globalized, more production lines have been controlled by multinational corporations.
However, these corporations are usually guided by the profit motives. It is recognized that
foreign direct investments often take place in “pollution havens” rather than at locations
with tight environmental policies. This means that a firm may organize production
effectively but ignore the externalities, which is a well-known market failure phenomenon.
Thus, if the pollution permit system is not the solution, neither is the multinational
corporation system.
Another alternative to market transactions is direct government regulation. Coase
(1960) argued that the government can influence the use of factors of production by
administrative decision and, thus, may solve problems at a lower cost. However, this is only
true under domestic circumstances. The government can regulate any production activities
and it has at its disposal the police and the other law enforcement agencies to make sure its
regulations are carried out. In pollution problems with international dimensions, direct
regulations can not be carried out since no powerful international government exists. To set
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up such an international government will be very costly, if not impossible, at least under the
current situation with many independent and powerful nation states. This line of reasoning
also asserts that the proposed global system of carbon taxes is infeasible.
A further alternative, as pointed out by Coase (1960), is to do nothing about the
problem if the government administrative costs are higher than the gain from solving the
problem. However, we do not propose this alternative since we believe that, in general,
cooperative opportunities do exist and we can design a cooperative program for a specific
environmental problem without setting up a powerful international government. In fact,
there already exist at least 140 international cooperative programs on various environmental
issues, some with as many as 161 signatories (Carraro and Siniscalco 1992). The question
is, do these programs work well and efficiently?
It should be noted that these international cooperative programs are different than
government regulations. They are voluntary agreements among sovereign countries. It is
precisely this fact which requires a sophisticated design of the cooperation program. That
is, in designing an international environmental program, we shall consider not only the
efficiency of cooperation and the way of how to cooperate, we shall also consider how to
implement it. Whether a cooperative program works well will depend on the type of
cooperation and the implementation mechanism. The latter aspect is related to incentives
and the free rider problem and has been discussed substantially in recent literature. It is to
be noted that although Samuelson (1954) asserted the "impossibility of decentralized
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spontaneous solution" in optimal provision of public goods, different implementation
mechanisms in the framework of game theory have been proposed in an effort to reveal an
agent's true preferences and avoid the free rider problem (Maskin 1985, Varian 1994).
Moulin (1995) submits that cooperation can be conceived in three fundamental
modes, namely, direct agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior; and argues that actual
cooperative institutions must accommodate all three modes. We shall follow Moulin's
proposition in designing the cooperative solution to the transboundary pollution problem.
Specifically, a political solution is developed which combines the virtues of all three modes;
i.e., decentralization in financing, distributive justice on public expenditures, and binding
agreement on cost share progressivity with respect to the distribution of the endowment.
With respect to Samuelson's problem in the optimal provision of public goods, a simple
mechanism is designed to implement the proposed solution.
Description of the Public Good Economy
We consider a free trade world and treat a transboundary pollution problem resulting
from economic activities as a pure public good (or public bad) in the international economy.
Production and consumption in some or all countries are causing emissions of hazardous
pollutants. Some environmental damages have already occurred due to previous economic
activities. In the former case, the provision of the public good implies emission abatement
in consumption and production activities; in the latter case it means resources must be
devoted to activities such as environmental cleanup operations. In dealing with any type of

39

international public good problem, all countries shall contribute to the effort.
Consider the economy with one public good, x ,and one private good, y, which will
act as a numeraire. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of agents (sovereign countries or
regions) in this economy. Each agent i,N is initially endowed with Ti > 0 units of the private
good. Agents can devote their endowment to private consumption or to public good
provision with the budget constraint
y i + g i (a i ) # Ti
for all i,N, where y i is the amount of private consumption of agent i, g i (a i) is the minimum
cost, measured in private good y, of effort (a i $ 0) devoted to the public good provision by
i. In an emission control problem, this effort can be defined as emission reduction or
abatement. In general, we assume that for every agent i,N, there is an upper limit ~ i of
effort a i and that the cost function has the following properties:
lim(a i 6 0) g i(a i) = 0, lim(a i 6 0) g i1(a i) = 0, and lim(a i 6 ~ i ) g i1(a i ) = +4,
where g i1(a i ) represents the first derivative of the cost function. Note that in an emission
control problem, ~ i can be interpreted as the reserved emission level of an economic activity
and a i is the amount of emission abatement defined in the interval [0, ~ i], as in Eyckmans
(1997). With this interpretation the cost properties are not difficult to understand.
The level of public good is the summation of all agents’ contributions: x = E i,N a i.
The public good is consumed collectively and equally by all agents. The consumption set Xi
of every agent i,N is then defined by
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Xi / {(y i, x)| y i + g i(a i ) # T i, x = E i,N a i }.
Preferences of each agent i,N are assumed to satisfy standard properties so that
they can be represented by a utility function u i(y i, x) defined on his consumption set. It is
further assumed that the utility function is concave and twice continuously differentiable,
and that the utility of each agent is strictly increasing in the private consumption and
nondecreasing in public consumptions:
u i1 / Mu i(y i, x)/My i > 0
and
u i2 / Mu i(y i, x)/Mx $ 0,
for all i,N.
Define for each agent i,N the personalized price for public good x as the marginal
rate of substitution between the public and private good, i.e.,
p i / u i2 / u i1 .
If the public good is environmental quality, then the personalized price is the marginal
willingness to pay for one additional unit of environmental quality in terms of the private
good and it measures at the margin the amount of consumption of the private good that
agent i is willing to give up to obtain an additional unit of environmental quality. Following
standard practice, we assume that pi is nondecreasing in the private good and nonincreasing
in public good:
pi1 / Mpi/Myi $ 0
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and
pi2 / Mpi/Mxt # 0
for all i,N. These are the binormal preference assumptions (Watts 1996) and are also
imposed in Eyckmans’ (1997) emission control problem.
The public goods economy is now characterized by õ / {Ti, Xi, ui }i,N. An
allocation of this economy is a 3n-tuple:
(a, y, x) / [(a1, y1, x), (a2, y2, x), ..., (an, yn, x)] ,ú+3n.
All possible behaviors within the economy in terms of each agent’s contribution decisions
and his private and public consumption can be described by feasible allocations:
DEFINITION 1: A feasible allocation of the economy õ is an allocation
(a, y, x)
such that
E i,N y i + E i,N g i(a i) # E i,N T i
and
x = E i,N a i.
A feasible allocation will be called Pareto efficient if it is not true that there exists another
feasible allocation which is preferred by all agents, and strictly preferred by at least one
agent, to the original allocation. A formal definition is given below:
DEFINITION 2: A Pareto efficient allocation of the economy õ is a feasible allocation
(a, y, x) such that there does not exist another feasible allocation (aN, yN, xN ) for which
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ui(yiN, xN) $ ui(y iN, xN ) for all i,N with strict inequality for at least one.
In the following, the outcomes of cooperative and noncooperative games in this
public good economy are analyzed respectively.
Noncooperative Game in the Public Good Economy
Consider first a noncooperative game. Each agent of the economy õ is treated as a
player in an n-person noncooperative game setting. In a transboundary pollution control
problem this is the case when the countries do not coordinate their environmental policies,
perhaps due to high transaction or monitoring costs or lack of implementable mechanisms
for direct agreement on the pollution control problem. Each player’s strategy is to decide
the levels of his private consumption and resources devoted to public goods provision.
Formally, denoted by Tj the strategy set of each player j,N,
Tj / {(a j, y j )| y j + g j(a j ) # T j }
which is assumed to be compact and convex. Further, define the joint strategy space of all
players T/J j,NTj. Then any joint strategy choice (a, y) / [(a1, y1), (a2, y2), ..., (an, yn)],S
induces an allocations of the economy:
(a, y, x) / [(a1, y1, x), (a2, y2, x), ..., (an, yn, x)]
where x = E j,N a j as mentioned before. Since the public good x is the same for all players,
we write the induced allocations as the same as the joint strategy choice for convenience.
Thus, by an allocation of the joint strategy, we mean a corresponding allocation of the
economy. An equilibrium in the game means an equilibrium in the economy. Now let the
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payoff for each player j,N be represented by his utility function uj : (yj,x) 6 ú, as defined
above, we have defined a noncooperative game {T,j u j }j,N associated with the public goods
economy õ .
Note that in this game, the strategy choices of other players affect player j’s utility
through his consumption set. In the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods,
it is usually assumed that each player chooses his strategy to maximize his utility while
taking as given the strategies of the other players in the noncooperative game. This
assumption is called Nash behavior and implies that every player in the game assumes that
his choice of strategy will not alter the strategy choice of other players.
DEFINITION 3: A Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game {Tj, u j}j,N is a 2ntuple of strategies (a*, y* ),T such that for every j,N
(a j*, y j* ) maximizes u j(y j, x)
subject to
y j + g j(a j) # T j,
and
a j = x - E i,N a i* , i…j.
To characterize a Nash equilibrium in the economy õ, we consider only interior
solutions. Then the first order conditions of the maximization problem of definition 1 yield
the well known system of equations:
g j1(a j* ) = p j , œj,N

(1)
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This system of equations says that each player j,N will make his contribution up to the point
at which his marginal cost of effort is equal to his personalized price for the public good.
The following proposition is clear.
PROPOSITION 1: An allocation (a*, y*) of the public good economy õ is a Nash
equilibrium if it satisfies condition (1).
In other words, a Nash equilibrium in the public good economy õ is induced by the
Nash equilibrium of the game {Tj, u j}j,N. Note that the interior solution constraint implies
the binding budget constraint, y j* + g j(a j* ) = T j for all j,N.
The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the public good economy
õ can be established by following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: For the game {T j, u j}j,N, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: (1) The existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from standard theorems (see,
e.g., Tan et al. 1995). The important assumptions are a compact and convex strategy set and
concave payoff function of player j for all j,N. These assumptions are satisfied in our game.
(2) Uniqueness of the equilibrium (a*,y*). Suppose, contrary to the assertion, that there
exists another Nash equilibrium (a §, y § ) … (a* , y* ). Without loss of generality, assume that
E a j§ $E a j*, then x § $ x* . From condition (1) and the binormal assumption of preferences
we would then have p j(y j§, x § ) # p j (y j* , x* ) and g j 1(a j§ ) # g j 1(a j* ) for each j,N. But given
the property of the cost function, this last inequality would imply that a j§ # a j* for all j,N,
which contradicts the assumption that E a j§ $ E a j* and (a §, y § ) … (a*, y* ).
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Note that in this noncooperative game we merely describe what would be the
outcome given the postulated behavior patterns of all players. We did not mention the
efficiency of the outcome. But here we state a proposition which will become clear in the
discussion of a cooperative game in next section.
PROPOSITION 3: The noncooperative Nash equilibrium is not a Pareto efficient
allocation in the public good economy õ.
Cooperative Game in the Public Good Economy
We turn now to analysis of a cooperative game in the public good economy. Given
the set N of agents in the economy, we consider a subset SfN as a coalition of players and
shall denote by ù the family of all nonempty coalitions. When a joint strategy choice (Tj)j,S
of a coalition S,ù is made and each member j in S commits to such a decision, one says that
cooperation among the members of S is made or, equivalently, that the coalition S forms.
A cooperative game explicitly formulates what each coalition can achieve by the cooperation
of its members. The simplest game of this class is a game in characteristic function form with
side payments defined as a function
w: ù 6 ú.
That is, the characteristic function w specifies the cooperative game. It is understood that
w(S) is the maximal total payoff of a coalition S,ù that the members of S can bring about
through their cooperation.
In general, the maximal payoff of a coalition in a game is not only dependent on the
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actions taken by its members, but also on the actions of players outside the coalition. For
this reason a cooperative game requires that the characteristic function specifies explicitly
what actions would be taken by the members of the coalition and outsiders. A conservative
way to get around this problem has been to assume that the players outside the coalition
adopt those strategies that are least favorable to the coalition. As such, we can define the
characteristic function as
w(S) = max{a j, y j }j,S E j,S u j (y j, x)
subject to
E j,S y j + E j,S g(a j ) # E j,S T j
and
E j,Sa j = x (if S = N),
= x - E i,N\ S ~ i (if S … N),
j
where g(a j ) = inf j,S g j (a)
for every j,S, and ~i is the reservation effort of player i,N\S who

does not join the coalition. Note that g(a j) represents the cheapest technology available to
every member in the coalition S. This can be made possible through a trade channel. For
example, the technology may be developed in one country of the coalition and then exported
to all other countries of the coalition. To avoid the complication, we simply assume that it
is available to all the member countries.
A characteristic function defined in this way is called an "-characteristic function and
games with an "-characteristic function are widely used in studies dealing with the core of

47

public goods economies (see, e.g., Foley 1970, Champsaur 1975, Moulin 1987, Chander
and Tulkens 1997). It should be noted, however, that this characteristic function is
problematic in our public good economy. If we treat the public good provision as the
emission abatement problem, then ~i is the reserved emission level as mentioned earlier. This
means that the outsiders of the coalition contribute nothing to the production of
environmental quality and continue their polluting without any abatement efforts. This is
the assumption imposed by Eyckmans (1997), where the coalition is assumed to be risk
averse and determines its optimal strategy for the worst possible reaction of the outsiders.
We shall avoid this assumption for three reasons. First, the free rider problem. In our public
good economy, such outsiders can enjoy the environmental good produced while
contributing nothing to it; this will discourage participating in a voluntary provision of public
goods and is one of the important considerations at international negotiation tables on
environmental issues. Second, since the outsiders are assumed to choose a zero level of
abatement, the total production of the environmental good in this cooperative setting is
lower than that produced in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. As a result, the outside
players may not only hurt the coalition but also hurt themselves, given the cost functions and
preferences of all the players. The last and most important reason is that, with an "characteristic function, coalitions are weakened by the presumed minimax behavior,
reducing hope that the corresponding "-core will be nonempty (Chander and Tulkens 1997).
In searching for alternative assumptions, Chander and Tulken (1997) proposed the
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so-called (-characteristic function, where players outside the coalition are assumed to have
an opportunity to play, individually, a Nash strategy against the coalition. That is, instead
of doing their best to obstruct the coalition’s plan, the outsiders are doing their best
according to their own preferences and technology. This is a more realistic assumption and
is consistent with individual rationality. Thus, we shall adopt this assumption. Consequently,
the characteristic function in our cooperative game becomes
w(S) = max{a j, y j }j,S E j,S u j(y j, x)
subject to
E j,S y j +E j,S g(a j ) # E j,S T j
and
E j,S a j = x (if S = N),
= x - E i,N\ S a i* (if S … N),
where a i* is the Nash strategy (contribution to the public good provision) of player i,N\S
who does not join the coalition. In this way, a cooperative game w is associated with the
public good economy õ.
In game theory, an important cooperative solution concept is the core. The core of
a game specifies the set of utility vectors which is achieved by each coalition. The set of
utility vectors specified by the above (-characteristic function forms the (-core. To avoid
becoming involved in dealing with the difficulties of the game-theoretic core concept (for
a discussion of the (-core properties, see Chander and Tulkens 1997), we shall focus on the
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grand coalition. This will also result in work on the first best (Pareto Optimal) setting. To
see why this is the case, note that the first-order conditions determining an interior solution
of the (-characteristic function can be written as:
g1(a j ) = E j,N p j , œj,N

(2)

where g1(aj ) is the marginal cost, as mentioned before. This system of equations says that
each player j,N has the same marginal cost of his effort committed to the public good
provision and that the marginal cost is equal to the sum of personalized prices for the public
good. This is exactly Samuelson’s (1954) condition for the optimal provision of public
goods where both productive efficiency and allocation efficiency are achieved.
By the same token of the noncooperative game, a joint strategy choice of the grand
coalition induced an allocation (a, y, x) of the economy. More importantly, the cooperative
solution for this economy is also unique. This gives the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: For the cooperative game w, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof: The proof of proposition 2 can be easily adapted here. The existence follows
since all the assumptions about the strategy set and payoff function hold. For the uniqueness,
let (a**, y ** ) be the equilibrium and suppose, contrary to the assertion, that there exists
another cooperative equilibrium (a §§, y §§) … (a** , y** ). Without loss of generality assume that
Ea j§§ $Ea j**, then x§§ $ x** . From condition (2) and the binormal assumption of preferences
we would then have Ep j (y j§§, x §§ ) # Ep j(y j**, x**) and g j1(a j§§ ) # g j1(a j**) for each j,N.
But given the property of the cost function, this last inequality would imply that a j§§ # a j**
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for all j,N, which contradicts the assumption that Ea j§§ $ Ea j** and (a§§, y§§) … (a**, y**).
In addition, the cooperative equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. One may use
definitions 1 and 2 to prove it. However, since this is obvious due to the equilibrium
condition satisfying Samuelson’s criterion, we only state the proposition here:
PROPOSITION 5: For the game w, the cooperative equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Recall that proposition 3 asserts the inefficiency of the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium. Comparing conditions (2) with (1), this assertion is now clear. The cost of
producing an additional public good is paid by a player himself in the noncooperative game,
but shared by all the players in the cooperative game.
Before ending this section, it will be shown that the cooperative equilibrium is also
a core allocation. We have mentioned that the core is an important cooperative solution
concept. It specifies the set of utility vectors which is achieved by each coalition. A utility
vector is then in the core if, 1) it is achievable by all of the players acting collectively, and
2) no coalition can attain a higher utility for each of its members. Formally,
DEFINITION 4: For any cooperative game w, a strategy (a**, y** ) of the grand
coalition is said to belong to the core of the game if it is not true that there exists a coalition
Sd N such that for each j,S, w(S)h u j(a j*§, y*§ ) > u j (a j**, y** ).
PROPOSITION 6: The cooperative equilibrium (a**, y** ) is in the core.
Proof: Suppose, contrary to the assertion, then there exists a coalition Sd N such
that for each j,S, w(S)h u j(y j*§ , x*§ ) > u j(y j**, x** ). Without loss generality, assume that
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y j*§ = y j** for all j,S and x*§ > x** . Let gS(a j ) = inf i,S (a j ) and gN (a j ) = inf i,N (a j ), then
we have gS(a j ) $ gN(a j ) for each j,S and g i(a i) $ gN(a i ) for each i,N\S. Note that the
total cost for the grand coalition is E i,N gN(a i** ), but, with the coalition S, the total cost
of a public good in the economy is E j,SgS (a j*§ ) + E i,N\S g i(a i*). Given the property of a
cost function, we know that the outsiders of the coalition will not contribute more than they
do in the grand coalition, and given the budget and the cost function, the coalition S will
contribute less than they do in the grand coalition. Thus we have
E j,SgS (a j*§ ) + E i,N\S g I(a i *) $ E i,N gN (a i **)
which means x*§ # x**, contradicting to the assumption. Similarly, we may prove the
assumption that y j*§ > y j** for all j,S and x*§ = x** not hold.
Gini Ratio Equilibrium
In the previous section a cooperative game is defined and the unique existence of the
cooperative solution proven. But there remains the problem of how to implement it. Note
that the cooperative game as defined is actually a cost-sharing game where the cost of the
production of a public good is shared by all the players. An important assumption of this
cooperative game is that each player’s personalized price for the public good is known to
everyone else. This has been a difficult issue in the literature of public goods economies and
cost-sharing games. The personalized price, as defined above, is the marginal rate of
substitution between the public and private good, or, in the case of the environmental good,
is the marginal willingness to pay for one additional unit of environmental quality in terms
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of the private good. This is strictly private information and, indeed, even the agent himself
may not know exactly his personalized price for public goods. Since Samuelson (1954)
showed the difficulties of the revelation of private preferences, many mechanisms have been
proposed to solve this problem (Groves and Ledyard 1977, Tian 1994, Varian 1994).
However, as pointed out earlier, the assumptions of these mechanisms per se make it
difficult to implement the decentralized system in the international public goods economy.
Thus, in the spirit of Samuelson (1954), Arrow (1971), and others who investigated
“welfare politics”, a political approach to this problem will be proposed.
Given the cooperative game defined above, the problem is how to decide the cost
share for each player. Instead of designing a mechanism to reveal each player’s true
preference, a mechanism is designed which reflects normative concepts and is comparable
with an international voting scheme. Let )n-1 = { r,ún+|E i,N r i = 1} be the n-1 dimensional
unit simplex; then define a cost share vector r,)n-1 such that for every i,N, the cost share
r i of player i is a function f of his own endowment T j and the difference of Gini Ratios ªG
between the initial endowment T and private consumption y of the economy, given the
optimal level of public good x** , i.e.,
r i = f [T i, ªG(T, y)] = f [T i, G(T) - G(y)| x** ], œi,N

(3)

where G is a single-valued function defined on the distribution of the initial endowment or
private consumption, with the same function form as the conventional Gini ratio defined on
income distribution.
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DEFINITION 5: A Gini Ratio Equilibrium (GRE) is an allocation (a, y) of the public
good economy õ such that the cost share vector r,)n-1 is determined by equation (3).
It is to be noted that GRE is a special form of Kaneko’s (1977) ratio equilibrium.
The existence of a GRE follows Kaneko’s Theorem I:
PROPOSITION 7: There exists a GRE.
Note, in the definition of GRE one does not specify the properties of function f,
which have political meanings and will be discussed in the following section. Here one can
say something about the positive concept. Note that under this cost sharing scheme, each
player gets a transfer d i = g i(a i ) - r iE j,N g j (a j), which may be positive or negative. But
the transfers are always balanced: E i,N d i = 0. Each player now faces a new constraint y i
+ g i(a i) # T i + d i. The budget constraint in the characteristic function of the cooperative
game w becomes
E i,N y i + E i,N r i E j,N g j(a j ) # E i,N T i
Given the cost share vector r, the first-order conditions determining an interior solution of
the new characteristic function become
g j1(a j )E i,N r i = E i,N p i , œj,N
But E i,N r i = 1 by definition and, thus, this first order condition is identical with condition
(2). That is, GRE satisfies Samuelson’s criterion. The following proposition is clear:
PROPOSITION 8: GRE is a Pareto optimal allocation of the public good economy
õ.
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As mentioned above, GRE is a special form of Kaneko’s (1977) ratio equilibrium.
Like Kaneko’s ratio equilibrium, the existence of GRE is not unique. It depends on the
chosen cost share vector r. Unlike Kaneko’s ratio equilibrium where players directly vote
the cost ratio, GRE votes the Gini ratio difference ªG(T, y) and determines the cost ratio
according to equation (3). More importantly, Kaneko (1977) showed that the core of the
voting game is nonempty and coincides with the ratio equilibria. This conclusion also holds
for GRE.
PROPOSITION 9: GRE is in the core.
Implementation of the GRE Solution
We now discuss the function f which determines the cost share of each player. We
assume that the function f is nondecreasing in each player’s initial endowment Ti and may
be nondecreasing or nonincreasing in the Gini ratio difference ªG(T, y), i.e.,
r i1 / Mr i[T i, ªG(T, y)]/MT i $ 0
and
r i2 / Mr i[T i, ªG(T, y)]/MªG # 0 or $ 0,
for all i,N. The intuition of the first property is obvious. The higher his endowment T i the
larger is the cost share of player i. This is consistent with the assumption of the preference:
p i1(y i, x) $ 0. For the second property, note that given the level of public good x and the
distribution of initial endowment T, every resulting distribution y of private consumption
determines the actual cost share vector r. While the total cost is shared among the players,
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that some players pays less implies that other players pay more. The differences of the initial
and resulting distributions is measured by ªG(T, y). Thus, the second property of the
function is not difficult to understand.
For a comparison of this mechanism and the popular Nash implementation which
depends on a compensation mechanism to reveal ”true preference”, let’s treat r i as an
approximation of the personalized price defined earlier, as pi. Write r i = pi +*i(ªG), where
*i(ªG) may be positive or negative, but *i(0) = 0 and Ei,N *i(ªG) = 0. This results in:
r i = [p i +*i(ªG)]/(Ej,N p j ),
for all i,N. Note that if ªG=0 then we have
r i = pi / (Ej,N p j )
for all i,N, which is the proportional cost share equilibrium (PCSE) proposed by Eyckmans
(1997) for a transboundary control problem using the Nash implementation mechanism.
Thus PCSE may be interpreted as a special case of GRE with ªG = 0. However, since PCSE
ignores the distributional issue, the solution is still infeasible even if a mechanism exists to
reveal the “true preference”. In contrast, GRE takes into account the distributional issue,
an important aspect of optimal public expenditures (Arrow 1971), thus achieving both
Pareto efficiency and distributive justice. More explicitly, note that pi / pi (y i, x), and the
PCSE and GRE ratios, respectively, can be written as
PCSE: r i = p i(y i, x) / (Ej,N p j(y j, x)) = r i(y i, x)
GRE: r i = [p i(y i, x) + *i (ªG)] / (E j,N p j(y j, x)) = r i(y i, x, ªG)
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Thus, the difference between PCSE and GRE is that the cost share of GRE has a third
argument ªG. It is this normal concept that serves as a focal point on the international
negotiation table under the Pareto optimal setting.
Now the problem is how to decide or vote a ªG. Should it be positive, negative, or
zero? This question can be answered using Arrow’s (1971) concept of equality in public
expenditures. In discussing the optimal distribution of public expenditure across a
population whose members differ in some respect, Arrow distinguished three situations:
input-equal, input-progressive, and input-regressive. These concepts are defined as follow.
Let gi be the public expenditures on a given individual, bi the capacity of the
individual to benefit from the expenditure, Ui(bi, gi) the utility derived by the individual.
Under the assumptions positive U1 and U2, an optimal policy satisfies the condition that U2
is constant over individuals. This condition then determines gi as a function of bi, and this
is the optimal allocation policy. The expenditure level gi is the input into the individual’s
production of benefits; therefore it is defined that (see Arrow 1971):
The policy gi(bi) is input-progressive, -equal, or -regressive if Mgi/Mbi < 0, = 0, or
> 0.
To relate this notion to the problem being addressed, assume that the capacity of an
individual to gain benefits from the public expenditure spent on him is a function of his
endowment, i.e., bi / bi(Ti). Then Mgi/MTi = [Mgi/Mbi][Mbi/MTi]. Accordingly, we have the
following three cases:
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Case 1: (Mgi/MTi) > 0 if input-progressive and (Mbi/MTi ) < 0, or if input-regressive
and (Mbi/MTi) > 0;
Case 2: (Mgi/MTi) = 0 if input-equal or (Mbi/MTi ) = 0;
Case 3: (Mgi/MTi) < 0 if input-progressive and (Mbi/MTi ) > 0, or if input-regressive
and (Mbi/MTi) < 0.
Under these situations, we can decide the sign of ªG.
Case 1, the public expenditure on an individual is increasing with his endowment,
then the cost share vector should be chosen such that ªG is positive, we call this cost share
vector progressive.
Case 2, the public expenditure on an individual is independent of his endowment,
then the cost share vector should be chosen such that ªG is equal to zero, we call this cost
share vector proportional;
Case 3, the public expenditure on an individual is decreasing in his endowment, then
the cost share vector should be chosen such that ªG is negative, we call this cost share
vector regressive. In this way, we relate the progressivity of the cost share vector r,)n-1
to the choice of a Gini ratio ªG.
To implement this Gini ratio, we adopt a taxation model which determines tax
incidence based on the income distribution and the elasticity of taxation (Zhou and Colyer
1999). In this model, it is shown that given a total tax revenue, the tax incidence and hence
the Gini ratio is a function of the income distribution of the population concerned and the
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income elasticity of the tax. Specifically, let m be the income distribution and $ the measure
of the elasticity, then the Gini ratio is G / G(m, $). Substitute this equation into the cost
share vector, we have r / r(T, $) and
ªG(T, y) = ªG(T, y(T, r(T, $)) = N(T, $).
Thus, we can choose the Gini ratio ªG -- the progressivity measure of the cost share vector
-- by choosing the parameter $, which can be specified in the range of, say, [-0.9, 0.9].
Returning to the international negotiation tables of public goods problems in general
and environmental issues in particular, given the initial endowment T and a project, the
task for the negotiators is to identify the cases defined above and reach an agreement on $ the political parameter. It is this parameter that makes possible a political solution which
combines the virtues of all three modes; i.e., decentralization in financing, distributive justice
on public expenditure, and a binding agreement on cost share progressivity with respect to
the distribution of endowment.
A comparison with Kaneko’s (1977) ratio equilibrium and Eyckmans’ (1997)
proportional solution will make clear the advantage of this model and the simplicity of its
implementation. First, this model includes distributive justice, which is absent in both
Kaneko’s and Eyckmans’ approaches. Second, suppose we are negotiating an international
project which involves 200 countries, by Kaneko’s approach we need to vote each cost
share for each of 200 countries, by Eyckmans’ approach every country needs to announce
a tax and subsidy rate for the other 199 countries and needs law enforcement to back the
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punishment for the difference between taxes and subsidies; while by our approach we need
only to vote (agree) on a real number $.
We now turn to next chapter for the applications of this model.
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CHAPTER V
MODEL APPLICATION: THE CASE OF GLOBAL WARMING

In this chapter the application of the GRE model is illustrated with the case of global
warming. There are three sections. The first section briefly describes the legacy of global
warming. The second section discusses the policy responses. The third section illustrates
how the GRE model can be applied to this case.
The Legacy of Global Warming
Global warming is an important issue that arose in the late 1980s and 1990s, as
mentioned earlier. Concern about the threat of global climate change arose from both a
succession of unusually warm years and projections of significant future warming by
elaborate computer models of the atmosphere in the 1980s. International efforts on this issue
can also be viewed as the extension of the work on other environmental issues, such as acid
rain and ozone layer problems, which had been solved (partially or mostly) in the 1970s and
1980s. It is interesting to note that in the 1890s Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius had
already tried to calculate the degree of global warming that might result from a doubling of
the amount of carbon dioxide, a major greenhouse gas (GHG), in the atmosphere due to the
burning of fossil fuels (Arrhenius 1896). Unfortunately, a century later, scientists are still far
from a complete understanding of the mechanism of global climate change.
The report by a special committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in
1979 may be considered a first step toward addressing the issue of global warming. It
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asserted that the rise in average temperature due to a doubling of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere ranges from 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius (NAS 1979). This assessment was
confirmed by another NAS report a few years later (NAS 1982). Thus, the estimate of the
range of average temperature change seems to be robust, but there is a large spread of
uncertainty - the upper limit is three times the lower limit. The uncertainties become even
greater when this temperature change is translated into climate changes. To avoid
controversies, both NAS reports referred to these upper and lower "limits" as "probable
error", and no quantitative interpretation of them has been made public (Schelling 1992).
The initial report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) in 1990
was a major landmark for international efforts on the global warming problem. The IPPC,
formed by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World
Meteorological Office, revisited the assessment of NAS with several climate models and
found no reason to alter the previously accepted range of temperature change. The report,
thus, described the potential for global warming and called for restrictions on carbon
emissions (Houghton et al. 1990).
It is to be noted that although most atmospheric scientists agree in principle that the
continued accumulation of human-induced carbon emissions will ultimately cause global
warming, the role of human CO2 in the global climate change remains uncertain. For
instance, Friis-Christensen and Lassen (1991) used a time series covering the period of
1860-1990 to analyze, using frequency domain method, the relationship between sunspots
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and global temperature anomalies and cast doubt on the prevailing scientific consensus that
claims a link between global temperature changes and GHG emissions, while Hansen and
Lebedeff (1988) show that volcanic activity and El Niño events have had significant impacts
on the global temperature record. In addition, Kuo et al. (1990) used spectral analysis to
show that changes in monthly Mauna Loa CO2 data lag those in monthly global temperature
series and concluded that more complete analyses (with multivariates) are warranted before
conclusions can be drawn regarding the causal relationship between atmospheric CO2
accumulation and global temperature. Furthermore, there still remains a lack of scientific
consensus as to many aspects of the potential for global warming, including its timing and
magnitude, and the question of whether a discernible warming has already begun (Knapp
and Mookerjee 1996).
Nevertheless, the 1990 IPPC report was sufficient to cause a widespread concern
about the global warming and how to prevent it. One of the important concerns is the
potential impact of climate change on the world food supply (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994),
echoing the first trend of environmental movement described in Chapter II. Economists
contributed to the global warming debate by focusing on the socioeconomic impacts of the
potential of global warming on economic activities, or the cost of policy responses that
might be adopted to restrict carbon emissions (Nordhaus 1991, Cline 1991, Schelling 1992,
Fankhauser and Pearce 1993, Hope et al. 1993, Fanhauser 1994, Hope 1994, Edmonds et
al. 1995, Dowlatabadi et al. 1996, Fankhauser and Tol 1996, Hope and Maul 1996,
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Hourcade and Robinson 1996, Kram and Hill 1996, Plambeck et al. 1996, Richels and
Sturm 1996). It should be noted that two benchmarks are often used: 1) a doubling of CO2
concentration in the atmosphere, and 2) holding carbon emissions at some level, say, the
1990 world emissions level. Further, due to uncertainties of both environmental and
social-economic origins, more assumptions and specifications have to be made. Thus, the
interpretation of these results should be done cautiously.
Policy Responses: FCCC and Flexibility Mechanisms
For policy responses to the global warming problems, economists had strongly
recommended two seemingly effective instruments - carbon taxes and trading systems.
However, as argued earlier, they are unlikely to be successful at the international level. The
international efforts - the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) - on this issue, as described below, indicated that trading mechanisms are difficult,
if not impossible, to implement. The carbon tax solution had not even been mentioned by
the FCCC treaties. Again, due to uncertainties, economists can only be sure that there would
be a tax-induced decrease in carbon emissions, but can not be sure of the consequences of
this decrease with respect to its impact on the environment and socioeconomic systems.
Uncertainties of the environment and socio-economic impacts may explain why
international efforts on this problem have been so fruitless. The FCCC, motivated by the
1990 IPCC report, was signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At that time,
there was widespread support among most developed countries and a group of 36 small
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island states for including a schedule of mandatory reductions in GHG emissions in the
convention. In the end, however, these nations yielded to the United States, which has
persistently opposed any such timetable. In the final form, thus, the treaty simply called upon
developed countries to "aim" at returning their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels
by 2000. As compared with the 20 percent global reduction in CO2 endorsed by the Toronto
conference in 1988, this represents a serious disappointment (Bodansky 1993, 1995;
Soroos 1998).
Three years after the Earth Summit, at the first session of the Conference of the
Parties to the Climate Change Convention (held in Berlin in March 1995), the delegates
agreed that the FCCC was not adequate to address climate change, but they postponed the
adoption of binding limits on GHG emissions until the third session of the Conference of the
Parties (COP3) in Kyoto in December 1997 (Rowlands 1995). The COP3 resulted in the
Kyoto protocol, which incorporated, with qualifications, a set of mechanisms known as
"flexmex" or "flexibility mechanisms", that have been discussed in the climate change
process for years. These include emissions trading, joint implementation (JI), and burden
sharing bubbles. Although widely hailed as a major breakthrough in the global process of
trying to find solutions to the problem of climate change, the Kyoto Protocol actually raised
many more questions than it answered. In particular, most developing countries opposed
these "flexibility mechanisms" (Lanchberry 1998, Ott 1998).
In view of these efforts, one can expect that there will be more COP meetings to
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debate over these flexmex, and one may predict that the results of these meetings will not
be very fruitful. It should be pointed out that the ideas underlying the flexmex, such an
emissions trading and bubbles, represent the willingness of letting market mechanisms
regulate carbon emissions rather than using human efforts to prevent potential global
warming. Economists may claim that under perfect market conditions, carbon emissions
regulated by the market mechanism would be optimal. However, to the extent that human
CO2 affects global climate, it can not guaranteed that such optimal emissions are consistent
with the goal man is pursuing. It will also raise new problems such as environmental ethics
and welfare effects, as mentioned earlier.
Of course, this does not mean that further debates of the coming COP meetings are
useless. The point here is how to improve international efforts on the potential global
warming problem. Take, for example, two issues that have been discussed in the FCCC: the
Clean Development Mechanism and carbon sinks. The Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) - a newly established program in the Kyoto protocol - is a compromise among a
wide range of different proposals from both developed and developing countries. The
mechanism is meant to serve as a tool for channeling assistance from developed countries
into projects that will result in emission reductions. However, the mechanism is basically
joint implementation (JI) and thus contentious in that it raises a multitude of issues that have
always been associated with JI between developed and developing countries (Lanchbery
1998). It may simply serve to move reductions from the South to the North under a
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carrot-and-stick package. This is no different from the situation where North-South tension
arises over trade and environmental problems, a difficulty mentioned earlier.
To improve CDM, the developed countries may focus on the world community
rather than the distinction of JI: that between developed countries and that between
developed and developing countries. The shift of the focus should make the efforts more
fruitful and more cost effective. A question here is whether there is such a self-enforceable
mechanism for these improved JI projects? This is what the GRE model is trying to answer.
Another term, 'sinks', has been debated hotly in FCCC and is included in the Kyoto
protocol. Sinks are commonly used to refer to the uptake of GHGs by forests, soils, oceans,
etc. The Kyoto protocol allows the inclusion of man-made sinks, notably forests (actually
not all forests are “man made”), for the reduction of a country's emissions target. It is said
that this might one day be considered the biggest flaw of the Kyoto protocol (Ott 1998).
There are two problems here. One is the uncertainty. As a report published recently in
Nature pointed out, there is a unsolved mysterious missing sink for atmospheric CO2
(Schindler 1999). Although several favorable theories have been offered to explain the
missing sink, no definite answer is given as to where in the biosphere the missing carbon is
hiding (Schindler 1999). The other problem is that, while rich countries can preserve their
sinks for the purpose of reduced emission targets, poor countries may depend on continuing
deforestation, while environmentalists of rich countries have been calling for reduction.
From the long-term perspective, it will be better to get carbon sinks out of FCCC treaties
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and promote the preservation of the tropical forests through JI projects, like those discussed
above.
Application of GRE Model to the Global Warming Case
Suppose that scientific evidence has shown that the tropical forests in Brazil,
Indonesia and Malaysia are important for the global environment, because deforestation in
these areas contributes greatly to climate change and causes global warming. A consensus
among the world community is reached to preserve these forests as international public
goods. According to FAO’s statistics (FAO 1995), the value of the annual exports of timber
from these three areas can be calculated and added up to $9.9 billion. Thus, let the value of
funds for these international public goods (as a JI project) be that amount. For simplicity,
we do not consider how to organize this JI project because the focus is on the question of
how the world community will share the cost. To fit this project in the GRE model, the
following assumptions are made: (1) the player set N of this cost sharing game is the number
of countries who participate the project; (2) the total GDP of each country is used as their
initial endowment; (3) each country has a representative at the international negotiation
table.
Now suppose that after negotiation, an agreement is reached that $ = .3, then the
cost share for each player is calculated according to the GRE model (see equation 3 in
chapter IV). These results are shown in the appendix. Note that due to space limit only it
lists only the per capita cost share, which is calculated as the total share of a country
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divided by her population. Also notice that the negotiation may result in, say, $ = 0 or $
=.-3. These two other scenarios are also calculated and shown together with the case $ =
.3 for demonstration purposes. To give some intuition of the concept, selected countries
which have a total cost share above $100 million or less than $100 thousand are given in
tables 1 and 2, respectively (notice that it assumes $ = 0):
Table 1. Cost shares (total & per capita) of top 17 countries for the project
COUNTRY
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
China(incl. HK)
Brazil
Canada
Spain
Korea, Republic of
Mexico
Australia
Netherlands
India
Argentina
Russian Federation

Popul’n
(Million)
271.648
125.638
82.190
58.543
57.240
58.201
1249.987
163.132
29.942
39.718
45.717
94.280
18.250
15.661
960.178
35.671
147.709

GDP ($)
(Per capita)

Share ($)
Share ($M.)
(Per capita)
(Total)

25514
36782
25179
24608
17921
17471
550
3786
18635
12201
8519
4041
18561
21536
309
8248
1951

9.69450
13.9760
9.56721
9.35024
6.80940
6.63842
0.20898
1.43856
7.08070
4.63599
3.23694
1.53545
7.05258
8.18298
0.11741
3.13397
0.74132

Note: per capita share is calculated as total share divided by population.
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2633.49
1755.91
786.329
547.391
389.770
386.362
261.225
234.675
212.010
184.132
147.983
144.762
128.710
128.154
112.735
111.792
109.499

Table 1 shows the top 17 countries contribute to this $9.9 billion JI project. As can
be seen from the table, for the United States, which has a per capita GDP of $25,514, the
cost share per capita for this project is about $9.7, and the total cost share is more than $2.6
billion. For Japan, whose per capita GDP is over $36 thousands, the per capita cost share
is about $14, while the total cost share is more than $1.7 billion.
Table 2. Cost shares (total & per capita) of bottom 15 countries for the project
COUNTRY
St. Vincent/Grenadines
Grenada
Dominica
Guinea-Bissau
Vanuatu
Comoros
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Equatorial Guinea
Tonga
Samoa
Palau
Marshall Islands
Cook Islands
Kiribati
Sao Tome and Principe

Popul’n
(Million)

GDP($)
(Per capita)

Share($)
Share($M.)
(Per capita) (Total)

0.106
0.089
0.072
1.112
0.178
0.652
0.041
0.420
0.093
0.168
0.015
0.045
0.019
0.073
0.117

2248
2437
2902
182
1117
301
4217
342
1482
700
5833
1719
3717
602
120

0.85417
0.92598
1.10267
0.06915
0.42442
0.11437
1.60232
0.12995
0.56311
0.26598
2.21635
0.65316
1.41234
0.22874
0.04560

0.091
0.082
0.079
0.077
0.076
0.075
0.066
0.055
0.052
0.045
0.033
0.029
0.027
0.017
0.005

Note: per capita share is calculated as total share divided by population.
Table 2 shows the bottom 15 countries which contribute to the project. For Kiribati,
which has a per capita GDP of $602, the per capita and total annual cost shares are 23 cents
($.23) and $17 thousand, respectively. For Sao Tome and Principe, which has a per capita
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GDP of $120, the per capita share is about 5 cents ($.05), and the total share $5,000.
Notice that in tables 1 and 2 it is assumed the policy parameter $ = 0. To
demonstrate the impact of this policy parameter on each player and hence each country’s
cost share, let the agreement is reached among the voters that, say, $ = 0.3 or $ = -0.3 ,
then the cost share for the United States are $2.9 billion or $2 billion, respectively. The
corresponding shares for Sao Tome and Principe are $1 thousand or $21 thousand,
respectively.
It is to be noted that the only data used in this model are each country's population
and its per capita GDP. They are from UN statistics. Population and GDP data are for 1997
and 1994, respectively. This data set should be sufficient for demonstration purposes. Also
note that only 195 countries are included here due to data availability3. Under the concept
of one-worldness, no “free-rider” should be allowed. Thus, in actual practice all countries
should be included in the model.
This may raise the question of whether the free-rider problem will automatically
disappear. That is, whether the GRE mechanism is self-enforceable. The answer is yes,
given the three following implicit assumptions: 1) scientific evidence proves that the public
good in question is indeed related to every one’s welfare on this planet, such as the global

3

Data source: Population Division and Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat,
and International Labour Office, 1998. Note that although in the UN statistics the data for
China and Hong Kong are separately listed, they are merged here. This should not affect the
illustration of the model. However, in practice it matters to everyone else as far as the cost
shares are concerned.
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warming problem, 2) there is rational behavior by each player and, hence, each nation. In
the last chapter it was shown that it is in each player’s interest to participate in the project.
A rational player will participate in the project if he realize the benefit of doing so, and 3)
the game is affordable. According to GRE model, the cost share of each player is a small
portion of his endowment. In addition, the GRE model explicitly tells each player’s share
to every one else. This can be considered a great advance for international transparency and
democracy.
Thus, the GRE model provides a means with which every nation can participate in
a global environmental project. It seems right to say that every country should be willing to
participate if there is a sound mechanism. An earlier international financial mechanism for
environmental projects is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), set up by the United
Nations and the World Bank in 1991. However, in the pilot phase of GEF, countries had to
contribute a minimum of $5.5 million in order to become a participant (Jordan 1994). This
seems to automatically create “free riders” in a global environmental project, since for some
countries $5.5 million is large and they would have difficulty in contributing it. With the
GRE mechanism, every country can make a contribution within its budget.
It also is noteworthy that, although the model is designed for transboundary
pollution problems, it can be applied to other international projects. Take, for example, that
the UN has difficulty in collecting its membership fees. Some countries do not pay their UN
membership fees; the reason being that they believe the system is unfair (rather than the
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countries being unable to pay). To improve this situation, the GRE model may be adopted
as a UN financial mechanism. Thus, instead of collecting a proportion of the lump-sum
expenditures from its members, the UN can treat each project individually with members’
voting for the policy parameter $. This will make everyone pay the fair share.
Some other factors might affect the implementation of the GRE mechanism, such
as monitoring and inspection of the project and how to prevent corruption. But these are
beyond the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The increase of human activities due to population growth and technological
progress inevitably brings about increasing environmental consequences. With international
trade, the agricultural and industrial revolutions during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries sowed the seeds of today's global environmental problems. Although international
perspectives on environmental concerns began to emerge at the beginning of the twentieth
century, it was not until the late 1960s, when the postwar economies of the world became
increasingly interdependent and environmental problems together with related political and
social-economic issues became more explicit in the international arena, that an
environmental "crisis" occurred in the United States, Canada, Japan, and most countries of
western Europe. Academic debates over trade and environmental issues that followed the
Biosphere and Stockholm Conferences were misplaced due to oil price shocks which led to
a productivity slowdown and deflationary policies in most western countries. It was not until
the release of the Brundt report, Our Common Future, that global environmental concerns
re-emerged and debates over trade and the environment were revitalized.
Overview of Trade and Environmental Issues
The purpose of the present study is to seek a cooperative solution for the global
environmental concern. It begins with the overview of trade and environmental issue.
Specifically, it discusses the postwar environmental movement, the debates over the
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two-way effects of trade and environmental problems, and the question of how to reconcile
the two. The 1960s' environmental crisis was considered to be a product of political,
social-economic and environmental problems in the aftermath of World War II. Three trends
in the postwar environmental movement were discerned: Malthusism, conservationism and
preservationism, and nuclear fallout - a fatal type of air pollution. Concerns about
environmental impacts were viewed as a natural development by the postwar environmental
movement and trade impacts on the environment as a feared product of trade liberalization.
The impacts of environmental controls on trade are classified into two types: 1) the
short-run competitive effects, which refer to the more immediate impacts of environmental
management on costs of production and product prices and, hence, on international
competitiveness, terms of trade, and the balance of trade; and 2) the long-run comparative
advantage effects, due to the environmental impacts on factor costs and product prices
which induce industrial structure adjustments and promote the relocation of production
factors, thus affecting international specialization and trade patterns. The impacts of trade
liberalization on the environment also are distinguished by two cases: 1) for those countries
which take primary commodity exports as their growth engine, trade may result in damages
to their natural resource bases; and 2) for those countries which depend on the export of
manufactured goods, environmental issues are mainly associated with air pollution, water
pollution, and disposal of hazardous wastes, as well as transboundary pollution problems.
In discussing the reconciliation aspect, a distinction is made between national and global
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perspectives, for which solutions or policy responses are designed. It is pointed out that
many environmental issues, such as ozone layer depletion, global climate changes, and biodiversity, are really international problems where policy responses should be designed from
an international perspective. It is also argued that multiple solution approaches, such as
technology and organization and voluntary partnerships, should be encouraged.
Overview of Methodological Approaches
After examining recent trends and developments in trade and environmental issues,
the methodological approaches which have been employed in the analysis of trade and
environmental issues are briefly reviewed. Specifically, the methodological approaches are
categorized into two groups: 1) international trade approaches, and 2) environmental
economics approaches. Some of the studies are mentioned under each group without giving
a detailed examination. More importantly, two cases are distinguished based on the theories
that underlies them. The first arises out of the concern about the trade repercussions of the
domestic environmental management or the effects of trade policies on domestic
environment. The second concerns the effects of trade liberalization on the international
environment. The first case can be fit into the international trade approaches and the second
into the environmental economic approaches. The difficulty in the latter case is that the
environment is traditionally defined within a national or regional boundary. So when the
theory is applied to an international setting, the perspective needs to be changed from
national to international, which is often ignored in trade-environmental debates.
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A Political Model of International Public Goods Problems
Following the review of the methodological approaches, a political model for
addressing the global environmental concern is presented. It begins with the discussion of
Coase’s treatment of the social cost problem and argues that the global system of carbon
taxes or emissions trading markets is infeasible. Then, it treats transboundary pollution
problems resulting from trade as international public goods in the world economy and seeks
cooperative solutions to the problem. Three considerations in seeking a cooperative solution
are efficiency, cooperation modes, and implementability. In a game-theoretic framework,
It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient in the public goods economy and
that the cooperative game with a gama-characteristic function has a unique equilibrium
which is Pareto efficient. Further, a new solution concept - Gini ratio equilibrium (GRE) is
proposed in the framework of welfare politics a la Samuelson and Arrow, in an effort to
overcome the difficulty usually encountered in implementing a decentralized system of the
international public goods economy. It should be noted that GRE is a special form of
Kaneko's ratio equilibrium, which in turn is a special form of Lindahl equilibrium. The
difference between GRE and Kaneko's ratio equilibrium is that GRE takes into account the
distributive aspect and eliminates the "free-rider" problem. More importantly, the GRE
model combines the virtues of all three fundamental modes of cooperation, i.e., direct
agreement, justice, and decentralized behavior. Finally, a taxation model is adopted to
implement the GRE model.
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Application of the GRE Model
The application of the GRE model is illustrated with the case of global warming, an
environmental issue to which many of the international efforts of the 1990s were devoted.
In so doing, the legacy of global warming and the policy responses, which were hotly
debated in FCCC meetings, are discussed. The application is then illustrated by treating the
tropical forests in Brazil, Indonesia and Malaysia - which are assumed as important factor
for global climate change - as international public goods in the world economy. The cost
share of each player (each nation) for saving these public goods is then calculated according
to the GRE model, after a policy parameter $ is voted. This parameter affects the
progressivity of the solution, i.e., its sign and magnitude determine how the costs are
distributed among the rich and the poor countries.
Implications for Further Studies
It also is noteworthy that, although the model is designed for transboundary
pollution problems, it can be applied to other international projects. For example, The UN
may adopt this mechanism and treat each project individually with members’ voting for the
policy parameter $.
Notice that the design of the GRE model assumes a majority voting rule. In practice,
this voting rule may need to be modified to overcome the minority problem in the voting
process. More work is required with regard to this aspect.
Also notice that some other factors might affect the implementation of the GRE
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mechanism, such as monitoring and inspection of the project and how to prevent corruption.
But these are beyond the scope of this study.
In conclusion, some comments on the analyses of trade and environmental problems
in general will be helpful. As mentioned earlier, although no independent theories for the
analysis of the entwined trade-environment issues exist, such problems can be fit into either
the theory of international trade or the theory of environmental economics. It is noteworthy,
however, that in environmental economics one may treat environmental problems either as
externalities or as public goods. The latter is the approach adopted for this study.

79

Bibliography
Alemdar, Nedim M., Suheyla Ozyildirim. "A Genetic Game of Trade, Growth and
Externalities." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22 (1998):811-32.
Amacher, G.S. and A.S. Malik. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal
Regulator." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30 (1996): 233-53.
Anderson, Kym. "Environmental Standards and International Trade." in M. Bruno and B.
Pleckovce, ed., Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996,
Washington: The World Bank, 1997.
Anderson, K. and R.E. Balwin. "The Political Market for Protection in Industrial
Countries." In A.M. El-Agraa, ed., Protection, Cooperation, Intergration and Development.
New York: Macmillan, 1987.
Anderson, James E. "Cross-Section Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem: Comment."
American Economic Review 71(Dec 1981): 1037-39.
Arifovic, Jasmina. "The behavior of the exchange rate in the genetic algorithm and
experimental economies." Journal of Political Economy 104(1996): 510-541.
Arifovic, Jasmina. "Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model." Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 18 (1994):3-28.
Arrhenius, S. A. "On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperatue."
Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 41(1896): 237.
Arrow, Kenneth J. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public
Expenditures." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 85(1971):409-15.
Asako, Kazumi. "Environmental Pollution in an Open Economy." Economic Records 55
(1979):359-67.
Babu, P.G. and Bibhas Saha. "Efficient Emission Reduction through Joint Implementation."
Environment and Development Economics 1(1996): 445-64.
Bac, Mehmet. "Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International
Environmental Resources." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30
(1996):301-315.
80

Baker, Marci. "Setting up trades in pollution allowances." Global Finance 7(Jun 1993):
15-16.
Balassa, bela. "The Changing Pattern of Comparative Advantage in manufactured Goods."
Review of Economics and Statistics 61(May 1979): 259-66.
Baldwin, Robert E. "Determinants of trade and Foreign Investment: Further Evidence."
Review of Economics and Statistics 61(Feb 1979):40-48.
Baldwin, Robert E. "Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade." American
Economic Review 64(Mar 1971): 126-46.
Barbier, Edward B., and David W. Pearce. "Thinking Economically About Climate
Change." Energy Policy 18(Jan/Feb 1990): 11-18.
Barnes, Philip E. "'Green' standards." Business & Economic Review 43 (Oct-Dec 1996):
24-28.
Baumol, William J. "On International Issues in Environmental Management." in Ingo Walter
ed., Studies in the International Environmental Economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1976.
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates. The Theory of Environmental Policy, 2nd ed.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge U. Press, 1988.
Beckerman, Wilfred. Small Is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens. London:
Duckworth, 1995.
Begley, Ronald. "ISO 9000: Environmental ISO standard adds to management tasks."
Chemical Week 156(Apr 5, 1995): 45-47.
Bertrand, Trent J. "An Extension of the N-Factor Case of Factor Proportions Theory."
Kyklos 25(Jul 1972): 592-96.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. "The Pure Theory of International Trade: A Survey." The Economic
Journal 74(1964): 1-84.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. "Trade liberalisation and 'fair trade' demands: Addressing the
environmental and labour standards issues." World Economy 18(Nov 1995): 745-759.

81

Bhagwati, Jagdish. "The Case for Free Trade." Scientific American (Nov 1993):42-49.
Blau, John R. "New ISO standard aims at leveling the playing field for green
manufacturers." Machine Design 67(Sep 28, 1995): 48-50.
Bodansky, Daniel. "The United Nationss Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary." Yale Journal of International Law 18(1993): 451.
Bodansky, Daniel. "From Rio to Berlin." Environment 37(Mar 1995): 2-3
Bohm, Peter. "Distributional Implications of Allowing International Trade in CO2 Emission
Quotas." World Economy 15 (Jan 1992): 107-114.
Borchert, Manfred. "An Empirical Investigation of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theory: A
Comment." Economica 36(May 1969): 193-95.
Bowen, Harry P. "Changes in the International Distribution of resources and Their Impact
on U.S. Comparative Advantage." Review of Economics and Statistics 65(1983): 402-14.
Bowen, H. and E. Leamer, and L. Sveikauskas. "Multicountry, Multifactor Tests of the
Factor Abundance Theorem." American Economic Review 77(1987):791-809.
Bowen, H. "Changes in the International Distribution of Resources and Their Impact on
U.S. Comparative Advantages." Review of Economics and Statistics 65(1983): 402-14.
Boyd, R., K. Krutilla, and W.Kip Viscusi. "Energy Taxation as a Policy Instrument to
Reduce CO2 Emissions: A Net Benefit Analysis." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 29(1995): 1-24.
Braham, James. "Don't Rush into ISO 14000." Machine Design 68(Jan 11, 1996): 38-42.
Brander, James A. "Strategic Trade Policy." in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff ed., Handbook
of International Economics, vol III, New York: Elsevier, 1995.
Branson, William H. and Nikolaos Monoyios. "Factor Inputs in U.S. Trade." Journal of
International Economics 7(1977): 111-131.
Brashares, J. "Cost Estimates for Environment Improvement Programs." in Allen V. Kneese,
Sidney E. Rolfe, and Joseph W. Harned eds., Managing the Environment: International
Economic Cooperation for Pollution Control. New York: Praeger, 1971.
82

Bridgen, Pamela J. "ISO 14000: The worldwide reaction of industry and governments."
Environmental Quality Management 6(Autumn 1996): 45-49.
Brown, Lester R. "A New Era Unfolds." in Linda Starke ed., State of the World 1993: A
Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society. New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1993.
Burkhart, Lori A. "Action and auction: The SO2 emissions allowances." Public Utilities
Fortnightly 131(Jun 15, 1993): 42-44.
Burtraw, Dallas. "The SO2 emissions trading program: Cost savings without allowance
trades." Contemporary Economic Policy 14(Apr 1996): 79-94.
Buttikofer, Johann. Proceedings of the International Conference for the Protection of
Nature, Basle: Swiss League for the Protection of Nature, 1947.
Byrne, Margaret M. "Is growth a dirty word? Pollution, abatement and endogenous
growth." Journal of Development Economics 54(Dec 1997): 261-284.
Carraro, Carlo, and Domenico Siniscalco. "The International Dimension of Environmental
Policy." European Economic Review 36(Apr 1992):379-87.
Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.
Champsaur, P. "How to Share the Cost of a Public Good?" International Journal of Game
Theory 4(1975):113-29.
Chander, Parkash and Henry Tulkens. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral
Environmental Externalities." International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997):379-401.
Chichilnisky, Graciela. "North-South Trade and the Global Environment." The American
Economic Review 84(1994):851-74.
Chipman, John S. "Factor Price Equalization and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem."
International Economic Review 10(Oct 1969): 399-406.
Chipman, John S. "A Survey of The Theory of International Trade: Part 1, The Classical
Theory." Econometrica 33(Jul 1965): 477-519.
Chipman, John S. "A Survey of The Theory of International Trade: Part 3, The Modern
83

Theory." Econometrica 34(Jan 1966): 18-76.
Chipman, John S. "A Survey of The Theory of International Trade: Part 2, The
Neo-Classical Theory." Econometrica 33(Oct 1965): 685-761.
Cichowicz, Judith A. "Should ISO 14000 be linked with ISO 9000?" Environmental Quality
Management 6(Autumn 1996): 77-80.
Cline, W.R. "Scientific Basis for the Greenhouse Effect." The Economic Journal 101
(1991): 909-19.
Coase, R.H. "The Problem of Social Cost." The Journal of Law and Economics 3 (Oct
1960):1-44.
Colyer, D., and A. Ferrise. "Real Property Tax Issues and Problems in West Virginia." In
Dale Colyer ed., Property Taxes in West Virginia. Morgantown, WV:Institute for Public
Affairs, West Virginia University, 1991.
Cookson, Nancy. "Operational flexibility: How flexible is it?" Journal of Environmental
Permitting 2(Spring 1993): 153-164.
Copeland, Brian R. and M. Scott Taylor. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution." The
American Economic Review 85(1995):716-37.
Copeland, Brian R. "International Trade and the Environment: Policy Reform in a Polluted
Small Open Economy." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26 (1994):
44-65.
Copeland, Brian R. and M. Scott Taylor. "Trade and the Environment: A Partial Synthesis."
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(1995):765-71.
Copeland, Brian R. and M. Scott Taylor. "North-South Trade and the Environment."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(1994):755-87.
Corden, W.M. "The Normative Theory of International Trade." in Ronald W. Jones and
Peter B. Kenen eds., Handbook of International Economics vol I. Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1984.
Cornia, G.A., R. Jolly, and F. Stewart. Adjustment with a Human Face: Ten Country Case
Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
84

Council on Environmental Quality, Department of Commerce, and Environmental
Protection Agency. The Economic Impact of Pollution Control, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1972.
Cropper, Maureen L. and Wallace E. Oates. "Environmental Economics: A Survey."
Journal of Economic Literature 30 (Jun 1992): 675-740.
d'Arge, Ralph. C. "International Trade, Domestic Income, and Environmental Controls:
Some Empirical Estimates." in Allen V. Kneese, Sidney E. Rolfe, and Joseph W. Harned
eds., Managing the Environment: International Economic Cooperation for Pollution
Control. New York: Praeger, 1971.
d'Arge, Ralph C. and Allen V. Kneese. "Environmental Quality and International trade."
International Organization 26 (Spring 1972):419-465.
Daly, Herman E. "The Perils of Free Trade." Scientific American (Nov 1993):50-57.
Dasgupta, Partha. "The Economics of the Environment." Environment and Development
Economics 1(1996): 387-428.
Dasgupta, Partha. "The Environment as A Commodity." Oxford Review of Economic Policy
6 (Spring 1990): 51-67.
Dean, Judith M. "Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature." Background
Paper for World Development Report 1992. Working Papers, WPS966, Washington, D.C:
The World Bank. pp27.
Deardorff, Alan V. "Weak Links in the Chain of Comparative Advantage." Journal of
International Economics 9(1979): 197-209.
Deardorff, Alan V. "The General Validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem." American
Economic Review 72(Sep 1982): 683-94.
Deevey, E.S., Don S. Rice, Prudence M. Rice, H.H. Vaughan, Mark Brenner, and M.S.
Flannery. "Mayan Urbanism: Impact on a Tropical Karst Environment." Science 206(19 Oct
1979):298-306.
Delphos, William A. "Funds for Global Greening." Global Trade 112(Mar 1992): 29.
Despotakis, K.A. and A.C. Fisher. "Energy in a Regional Economy: A Computable General
85

Equilibrium Model for California." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
15(1988): 313-332.
Devarajan, Shantayanan. "Environment and Trade in General Equilibrium: Theory,
Methodology, and Evidence: Discussion." American Journal of Agricultural Economics
77(1995): 786-88.
Devlin, R.A. and R.Q. Grafton. "Tradable Permits, Missing Markets, and Technology."
Environmental and Resource Economics 4(1994): 171-186.
Dixey, F. "Conservation and Utilization of World Resources: United Nations Conferences."
Nature 164(12 Nov 1949):813-15.
Dorfman,Robert, Paul A. Samuelson, and Robert M. Solow Linear Programming and
Economic Analysis. New York: McGrawhill, 1958.
Dowlatabadi, Hadi, Lester B. Lave, and Armistead G. Russell. "A Free Lunch at Higher
CAFE?" Energy Policy 24(1996): 253-264.
Drabicki, john Z. and Akira Takayama. "An Antinomy in the theory of Comparative
Advantage." Journal of International Economics 9(1979): 211-223.
Dudley, Chris Elliott, and Sue Stolton. "A Framework for the Environmental Labeling."
Environment 39 (Jul/Aug 1997): 16-20, 42-45.
D’Amico, Esther. "Socma embraces codes." Chemical Week 157(Dec 6, 1995): 40.
Earthscan. Cropland or Wasteland: The Problems and Promises of Irrigation. London:
Earthscan, 1984.
Economist, The. "A Survey of The Global Environment." The Economist (May 30, 1992):
1-24.
Edmonds, Jae, Marshall Wise and David W. Barns. "Carbon Coalitions: The Cost and
Effectiveness of Energy Agreements to Alter Trajectories of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide
Emissions." Energy Policy 23(1995): 309-335.
Ehrlich, Paul R. The Population Bomb, New York: Ballantine Books, 1968.
Elbasha, Elamin H; Terry L. Roe. "On Endogenous Growth: The Implications of
86

Environmental Externalities." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
31(1996):240-268.
Espinosa, J. Andres and V. Kerry Smith. "Measuring the Environmental Consequences of
Trade Policy: A Nonmarket CGE Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural Economics
77 (1995): 772-77.
Esty, Daniel C. Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future. Washinton,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994.
Ethier, Wilfred. "Some of the Theorems of International trade with Many Goods and
Factors." Journal of International Economics 4(May 1974): 199-206.
Evans, Richard. "Blue-skying new products." Global Finance 7 (Feb 1993): 29.
Evans, Michael K. "A Forecasting Model Applied to Pollution Control Costs." The
American Economic Review 63 (1973):244-52.
Eyckmans, Johan. "Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International
Pollution Control Problems." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33
(1997):314-30.
Fahrer, Sharon. "Emissions Trading Programs Making Sense of the Options: Don't
Overlook the Economic Incentives Offered by These Programs." Chemical Engineering 103
(Mar 1996): 139-144.
Fankhauser, Samuel, and Richard S.J. Tol. "Climate Change Costs: Recent Advancements
in the Economic Assessment." Energy Policy 24(1996): 665-673.
Fankhauser, S. Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of The Greenhouse Effect.
London: Earthscan, 1994.
Fankhauser, S. and D.W. Pearce. "The Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions." paper
to The OECD/IEA International Conference on the Economics of Climate Change,
OECD/DG(93)74, OECD, Paris, 1993.
Fankhauser, Samuel, Richard S.J. Tol, and David W. Pearce. "The Aggregation of Climate
Change Damages: A Welfare Theoretic Approach." Environmental and Resource
Economics 10(1997): 249-266.

87

FAO. Commodity Review and Outlook 1994-95. FAO Economic and Social Development
Serties No. 53, Rome: FAO, 1995.
Foley, Duncan K. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods."
Econometrica 38 (1970): 66-72.
Fox, Stephen. John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement, Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1981.
Foy, George. "Toward Extension of the GATT Standards Code to Production Processes."
Journal of World Trade 26 (Dec 1992): 121-131.
Fredriksson, Per G. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy."
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33 (1997): 44-58.
French, Hilary F. "Reconciling Trade and the Environment." in Linda Starke ed., State of
the World 1993: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993.
Friis-Christensen, E. and R. Lassen. "Length of the Solar Cycle: An Indicator of Solar
Activity Closely Associated With Climate." Science 254(1991): 698-700.
Gandolfo, Giancarlo. International Economics I: The Pure Theory of International Trade
[2nd, revised ed.] Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994.
Garner, W. Lynn. "Utilities swap pollution credits in 'gutsy' program." Public Utilities
Fortnightly 133(Jan 1, 1995): 12.
Geddis, Robert. "New EPA Permit Program Has Costly Implications for Steelmakers." Iron
Age 8 (Sep 1992): 52-53.
George, S. A Fate Worse Than Debt. New York: Grove Press, 1988.
Goulder, L.H. "Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An
Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis." Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 29 (1995): 271-97.
Graham, Frank D. The Theory of International Values. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1948.

88

Groves, Theodore, and John Ledyard. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution
to the 'Free Rider' Problem." Econometrica 45 (1977):783-811.
Grubel, Herbert G. "Some Effects of Environmental Controls on International Trade: The
Hechscher-Ohlin Model." in Ingo Walter ed., Studies in the International Environmental
Economic. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.
Hanemann, W. Michael. "Improving environmental policy: Are markets the solution?"
Contemporary Economic Policy 13(Jan 1995): 74-79.
Hansen, J.L., and B. Lebedeff . "Global Surface Air Temperature: Updated Through 1987."
Geophysical Research Letters 15 (1998): 323-26.
Hardin, G. "The Tragedy of the Common." Science 162 (Dec 1968): 1243-48.
Harkness, Jon. "Cross-Section Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem: Reply." American
Economic Review 71(Dec 1981): 1044-48.
Harkness, Jon. "Factor Abundance and Comparative Advantage." American Economic
Review 71(Dec 1978): 784-800.
Harris, Paul. "Chemical Industry Lauds 'Responsible Care' Goals." Environment Today 2
(Apr 1991): 3.
Harris, Paul. "Two credit trading plans make gains." Environment Today 4 (Nov 1993): 1.
Heller, H. Robert. International Trade Theory and Empirical Evidence. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Heller, Peter S. "Factor Endowment Change and Comparative Advantage: the Case of
Japan, 1956-69" Review of Economics and Statistics 58(1976):283-69.
Heller, Karen. "Responsible Care - Public Outreach: The Stakes Are High." Chemical Week
148 (Jul 17, 1991): 81-84.
Helm, Dieter, and David Pearce. "Assessment: Economic Policy towards the Environment."
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6(Spring 1990):1-16.
Heyes, Anthony, and Catherine Liston-Heyes. "Sustainable Resource Use: The Search for
Meaning." Energy Policy 23(1995): 1-3.
89

Hoel, M. "Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 27(1994): 259-74.
Hoel, Michael. "Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2." Energy
Journal 12(1991): 93-107.
Hoel, Michael. "Carbon Taxes: An International Tax or Harmonized Domestic Taxes?"
European Economic Review 36 (Apr 1992):400-406.
Holland, John H. Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis
with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence. Ann Arbor, Michigan:
The University of Michigan Press, 1975.
Holland, John H. "Robust Algorithms for Adaptation Set in a General Formal Framework."
In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Adaptive Processes: Decision Control. New
York: Inst. Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 1970.
Holtz, Susan . "Environment-Economy Integration." Canadian Business Review 16(Summer
1989): 25-28.
Hope, C.W., J.P. Anderson, and P. Wenman. "Policy Analysis of Greenhouse Effect."
Energy Policy 21(1993): 327-338.
Hope, Chris and Philip Maul. "Valuing the Impact of CO2 Emissions." Energy Policy
24(1996): 211-219.
Hope, D.W. "Nuclear Power and Global Warming: A First Cost-Benefit Analysis." Energy
and Environment 5(1994): 195-206.
Houghton, J.T., G.J. Jenkins, and J.J. Ephraums, eds. Climate Change: The IPCC
Scientific Assessment. Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1990.
Hourcade, Jean-Charles and John Robinson. "Mitigating Factors: Assessing the Costs of
Reducing GHG Emissions." Energy Policy 24(1996): 863-873.

Howe, Charles W. "Taxes versus Tradable Discharge Permits: A Review in the Light of the
U.S. and European Experience." Environmental and Resource Economics 4(1994):
151-169.

90

Hunter, David. "Mexico's Responsabilidad Integral Gets Rolling." Chemical Week 150(Apr
15, 1992): 12.
Ichiishi, Tatsuro. Game Theory for Economic Analysis. New York: Academic Press 1983.
Inada, Ken-Ichi. "The production Coefficient Matrix and the Stolper-Samuelson Condition."
Econometrica 39(1971): 219-39.
Ingham, Kenneth. A History of East Africa. London:Longman, 1963.
Johnson, Harry G. "The Possibility of Factor-Price Equalisation when Commodities
outnumber Factors." Economica 34(Aug 1967): 282-88.
Johnson, Harry G. International Trade and Economic Growth: Studies in Pure Theory.
Cambridge, Mass: harvard University Press, 1958.
Johnson, Brian. "Foreign Aid and the Environment." Ambio 8 (1979): 112-113.
Jones, Ronald W. "The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models." Journal of
Political Economy 73(Dec 1965): 557-725.
Jones, Arthur. "Tools of the trade." World Trade 9 (Jul 1996): 18-20.
Jones, Ronald W. "Comparative Advantage and the Theory of Tariffs: A Multi-Country,
Multi-Commodity Model." Review of Economic Studies 28(1961): 161-75.
Jones, Ronald W. "Distortions in Factor Markets and the General Equilibrium Model of
Production." Journal of Political Economy 79(1971): 437-59.
Jones, Ronald W. "Trade with Non-traded Goods: the Anatomy of inter-connected
Markets." Economica 41(May 1974): 121-38.
Jones, Ronald W. "A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History." in J.N. Bhagwati,
R.W. Jones, R.A. Mundell, and J. Vanek eds., Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971 p.3-21.
Jones, Ronald W. and J. Peter Neary. "The Positive Theory of International Trade." in
Ronald W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen eds., Handbook of International Economics vol I.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984.

91

Jones, Ronald W. "Income Distribution and Effective Protection in a Multicommodity trade
Model." Journal of Economic Theory 11(1975): 1-15.
Jordan, Andrew. "Paying the Increamental Costs of Global Environmental Protection: The
Evolving Role of GEF." Environment 36 (Jul/Aug 1994): 12-20, 31-36.
Kaneko, Mamoru. "The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Goods
Economy." Journal of Economic Theory 16 (1977):123-36.
Katrak, Homi. "An Empirical Test of Comparative Cost Theories: Japan, Peru, the United
Kingdom and the United States." Economica 36(Nov 1969): 389-99.
Kemp, Murray C. and Ngo Van Long. "The Role of Natural Resources in Trade Models."
in Ronald W. Jones and Peter B. Kenen eds., Handbook of International Economics vol I.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984.
Kenen, Peter B. "Nature, Capital, and Trade." Journal of Political Economy 73(Oct 1965):
437-60 .
Kou, C., Craig Lindberg and David Thomson. "Coherence Established between
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Global Temperature." Nature 343(1990):709-13.
Kennedy, P.W. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect
Competition." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27 (1994): 49-63.
Ketting, N.G. "Towards a Sustainable Energy Future." Energy Policy 23 (1995): 637-638.
Klaassen, Ger A.J., Finn R. Førsund, and Markus Amann. "Emission Trading in Europe with
an Exchange Rate." Environmental and Resource Economics 4 (1994): 305-330.
Klotz, Benjamin P. "The Trade Effects of Unilateral Pollution Standards." in Problems of
Environmental Economics. Paris: O.E.C.D., 1972.
Knapp, Tom, and Rajen Mookerjee. "Population Growth and Global CO2 Emissions: A
Secular Perspective." Energy Policy 24(1996): 31-37.
Koo, Anthony Y. C. "Environmental Repercussions and Trade Theory." Review of
Economics and Statistics 56 (1974): 235-44.
Kram, Tom, and Douglas Hill. "A Multinational Model for CO2 Reduction: Defining
Boundaries of Future CO2 Emissions in Nine Countries." Energy Policy 24(1996): 39-51.
92

Labys, Walter C. Dynamic Commodity Models: Specification, Estimation, and Simulation.
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973.
Labys, Walter C. "Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation Models of Mineral and Energy
Markets." in Walter C. Labys, Takashi Takayama, and Neol D. Uri eds., Quanttative
Methods for Market-Oriented Economic Analysis over Space and Time. Aldershot:
Avebury 1989.
Lake, Elizabeth E., William M. Hanneman, and Sharon M. Oster. Who Pays for Clean
Water? The Distribution of Water Pollution Control Costs. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1979.
Lanchbery, John. "Expectations for the Climate Talks in Buenos Aires: The Fourth
Conference of the Parties Will Attempt to Untangle the Issues Left Unsolved at Kyoto."
Environment 40 (Oct 1998): 16-20, 42-45.
Lanchbery, John. "Expectations for the Climate Talks in Buenos Aires: The Fourth
Conference of the Parties Will Attempt to Untangle the Issues Left Unsolved at Kyoto."
Environment 40 (Oct 1998): 16-20, 42-45.
Land, A.H. "Factor Endowments and Factor Prices." Economica 26(May 1959): 137-42.
Lang, Winfried. "Environmental Protection: The Challenge for International Law." Journal
of World Trade Law 20 (Sep/Oct 1986):489-96.
Layton, Leslie. "Mexico's Responsabilidad Integral: A High-Stake Move." Chemical Week
149 (Dec 11, 1991): 60-66.
Leamer, Edward E. and Harry P. Bowen. "Cross-Section Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin
Theorem: Comment." American Economic Review 71(Dec 1981): 1040-43.
Leamer, Edward E. and James Lavinsohn. "International Trade Theory: The Evidence." in
Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff eds., Handbook of International Economics vol
III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.
Leamer, Edward E. Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and
Evidence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.
Ledyard, John O. and Kristin Szakaly-Moore. "Designing organizations for trading pollution
rights." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 25 (Oct 1994): 167-196.
93

Lemons, John. "Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection: A perspective on
Current Trends and Future Options for Universities." Environmental Management 19
(1995):157-65.
Leonard, H. Jeffrey. Pollution and the Struggle for the World Product. Cambridge, Eng.:
Cambridge U. Press, 1988.
Leontief, W. W. "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Position
Reexamined." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 97(1953): 332-49.
Leontief, Wassily. "Environmental Repercussions and the Economic Structure: An
Input-Output Approach." Review of Economics and Statistics 52 (1970):262-71.
Leopold, Aldo. Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.
Lessen, Nichole and Christopher Flavin. "Sustainable Energy for Tomorrow's World; The
Case for an Optimistic View of the Future." Energy Policy 24 (1996): 769-781.
Lewis, Tracy R. and David E. M. Sappington. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits
and other scarce resource rights under limited information." Journal of Public Economics
57 (Jul 1995): 431-455.
Lindahl, Erik. "Just Taxation - A Positive Solution." 1919. Translated from german by
Elizabeth Henderson and reprinted in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock eds.,
Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. London: MacMillan & Co., 1958.
Lindzen, R. "Some Coolness Concerning Global Warming." Bulletin of the American
Meteorogical Society 71 (1990): 288-99.
Lopez, Ramon. "The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Effects of Economic
Growth and Trade Liberalization." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
27 (1994): 163-184.
Lowe, Philip. "Values and Institutions in the History of British Nature Conservation," in A.
Warren, and F.B. Goldsmith, eds., Conservation in Perspective, London: Wiley, 1983.
Lucas, Allison. "Pollution trading rights could spread." Chemical Week 154 (Apr 6, 1994):
16.
Madati, Posanyi J. and Edward J. Kormondy. "Chapter 1 Introduction." in Edward J.
94

Kormondy ed. International Handbook of Pollution Control. New York: Greenwood Press,
1989
Magee, Stephen P. and William F. Ford. "Environmental Pollution, The Terms of Trade and
Balance of Payments of The United Staes." Kyklos 25 (1972): 101-18.
Mahoney, Richard J. "The only way to deal with challenges: Environmentalism and the free
trade agreement." Executive Speeches 7 (Dec 1992/Jan 1993): 40-42.
Maler, Karl-Goran, and Mohan Munasinghe. "Macroeconomic Policies, Second-Best
Theory and the Environment." Environment and Development Economics 1(1996): 149-63.
Malthus, Thomas R. An Essay on the Priciple of Population (1798). Reprint, Philip
Appleman ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976.
Marin, Alan. "Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control:
Comment." Journal of Environmental Economics & Management 21(Nov 1991): 297-300.
Marks, S.V. and J. McArthur. "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of protection: A
Survey and Some New Results." in J.S. Odell and T.D. Willett, eds., International Trade
Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and Political Science, Ann Arbor,
Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1990.
Maskin, Eric S. "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: a Survey." in L.
Hurwicz, D. Scheidler, and E. Pazner eds. Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays
in Memory of Elisha Pazner. London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985.
Matsuo, Naoki. "Key Elements Related to the Emissions Trading for the Kyoto Protocol."
Energy Policy 26(1998): 263-273.
Mayer, Wolfgang. "Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium for a Small open Economy."
Journal of Political Economy 82(1974): 955-67.
McAfee, K. Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in
Caribbean. London: Zed Books, 1991.
McCormick, John. Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement.
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989.
McGee, Robert W. "The Moral Case for Free Trade." Journal of World Trade 29(Feb
95

1995):69-76.
McGuire, Martin. "Regulation, Factor Rewards, and International Trade." Journal of Public
Economics 17(1982):335-54.
McKenzie, Lionel W. "Specialization in Production and the Production Possibility Locus."
Review of Economic Studies 23(1956): 56-64.
McKenzie, Lionel W. "Specialisation and Efficiency in World Production." Review of
Economic Studies 21(1954): 165-80.
McKenzie, Lionel. "On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other
Competitive Systems." Econometrica 22(1954): 147-61.
Mello, Jeffrey A. "The environmental cost of free trade." Business & Society Review 91(Fall
1994): 18-28.
Melvin, James R. "Production and Trade with Two Factors and Three Goods." American
Economic Review 58(Dec 1968): 1249-68.
Merrifield, John D. "The Impact of Selected Abatement Strategies on Transnational
Pollution, the Terms of Trade, and Factor Rewards: A General Equilibrium Approach."
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15(1988): 259-284.
Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to
Social Philosophy. 1848. Revised ed. vol I. New York: The Colonial Press, 1900.
Mishan, E.J. "The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay." Journal
of Economic Literature 9 (Mar 1971): 1-28.
Moulin, Herve. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good." Econometrica
55(1987):963-76.
Moulin, Herve. Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Muller, R. Andrew and Stuart Mestelman. "Emission trading with shares and coupons: A
laboratory experiment." Energy Journal 15(1994): 185-211.
Murota, Yasuhiro, and Kokichi Ito. "Global Warming and Developing Countries: The
96

Possibility of a Solution by Accelerating Development." Energy Policy 24(1996):
1061-1077.
Mussa, Michael. "Tariffs and the Distribution of Income: the Importance of Factor
Specificity, Substitutability, and intensity in the Short and Long Run." Review of Economic
Studies 82(1974): 1191-203.
Mutti, John H. and J.David Richardson. "International Competitive Displacement from
Environmental Control: The Quantitative Gains from Methodological Refinement." Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 4(1977): 135-52.
NAS. Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1979.
NAS. Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Second Assessment, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1982.
Nash, John F., Jr. "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games." Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences.36 (1950): 48-9.
Nash, John F., Jr. Essays on Games Theory. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996.
Nash, Jennifer, and John Ehrenfeld. "Code Green." Environment 38 (Jan/Feb 1996): 16-20,
36-45.
Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind. New Haven, Conneticut: Yale
University Press, 1973.
Nicholson, Max. The Environmental Revolution. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972.
Nordhaus, W.D. "Economic Approaches to Greenhouse Warming." in Rudiger Dornbusch
and James M. Poterba, eds., Global Warming: Economic Policy Response. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1991.
OECD. Problems in Transfrontier Polution. Paris: OECD, 1974.
Ohlin, Bertil. Interregional and International Trade. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1933.
OI, Walter Y. "Labor as a Quasi-fixed Factor." Review of Economic Studies 70(1962):
97

538-55.
Osborn, Fairfield. Our Plundered Planet. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1948.
Osborn, Fairfield. The Limits of the Earth. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1953.
Ott, Hermann E. "The Kyotol Protocol: Unfinished Business" Environment 40 (Jul/Aug
1998): 16-20, 41-45.
Ozyildirim, S. "Three-Country Trade Relations: a Discrete Dynamic Game Approach."
Computers Math. Applic. 32(1996):43-56.
Parkinson, Gerald. "Steelmaking Renaissance." Chemical Engineering 98 (May 1991):
30-35.
Parson, Edward A. and Owen Greene. "The Complex Chemistry of the International Ozone
Agreements." Environment 37 (Mar 1995): 16-20, 35-43.
Pasurka, Jr. Carl A. "The Short-Run Impact of Environmental Protection Costs on U.S.
Product Prices." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 11 (1984):
380-90.
Patterson, Eliza. "GATT and the Environment: Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse Trade
and Environmental Effects." Journal of World Trade 26(Jun 1992):99-109.
Pavetto, Carl S. and Sam K. Bae. "A Market-Based Approach to Pollution Control." Public
Utilities Fortnightly 127 (May 1, 1991): 26-30.
Pearce, David and Edward Barbier. "The Greenhouse Effect: A View from Europe." Energy
Journal 12 (1991): 147-160.
Pearson, Frank, and Floyd Harper. The World's Hunger. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1945.
Pethig, Rudiger. "Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in the Theory of
Comparative Advantage." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2 (1976):
160-69.
Phipps, Tim T., Pierre R. Crosson, and Kent A. Price eds. Agriculture and the Environment.
Resources for the Future/Washington, D.C.: National center for Food and Agricultural
98

Policy, 1986.
Phipps, Tim T. "Land Prices and Farm-Based Returns." American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 66 (1984): 424-29.
Pigou, A.C. The Economics of Welfare. (1920), reprint of fourth edition, London:
Macmillan, 1948.
Plambeck, Erica L. and Chris Hope. "PAGE95: An Updated Valuation of the Impacts of
Global Warming." Energy Policy 24(1996): 783-789.
Pluge, Wolf. "Climate Protection Policy: New Taxes or Voluntary Undertakings?" Energy
Policy 25 (1997): 119-124.
Popoff, Frank. "The new Gemini: The economy and the environment." Vital Speeches 59
(May 1, 1993): 427-429.
Portney, Paul R. "The Macro-economic Impacts of Federal Environmental Regulation." in
Henry M. Peskin, Paul R. Portney, and Allen V. Kneese eds., Environmental Regulation
and The U.S. Economy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
Pratt, Katherine M. "Environmental standards could govern trade." Transportation &
Distribution 38 (Feb 1997): 68-76.
Ranger, Edward M., Jr. "Environment Gains an Edge: NAFTA Adds an International
Dimension to Environmental Regulation." Business Mexico 2(Oct 2, 1992): 38-39.
Ray, E.J. "Empirical Research on Political Economiy of Trade." In C.A. Carter, A.F.
McMacalla, and J. Sharples, eds., Imperfect Competition and Political Economy. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1990.
Reisch, Marc S. "Chemical industry tries to improve its community relations." Chemical &
Engineering News 72(Feb 28, 1994): 8-21.
Reisch, Marc. "Trading in Pollution Rights Nearer Reality." Chemical & Engineering News
70(Feb 10, 1992): 19-20.
Ricardo, David .The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. (1817), reprint of third
edition, Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963.

99

Richels, Richard and Peter Sturm. "The Costs of CO2 Emission Reductions: Some Insights
from Global Analyses." Energy Policy 24(1996): 875-887.
Ritchie, Mark. "The Green Lobby Raises a Red Flag on Agreement." International Business
4 (Nov 1991): 82.
Robertson, D.H. "The Future of International Trade." The Economic Journal 48(1938):
1-14.
Robison, H. David. "Who Pays for Industrial Pollution Abatement?" Review of Economics
and Statistics 67(1985):702-6.
Robison, H. David. "Industrial Pollution Abatement: The Impact on Balance of Trade."
Canadian Journal of Economics 27(1988):187-99.
Rodrik, Dani. "Political Economy of Trade Policy." in Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth
Rogoff eds., Handbook of International Economics vol III. Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1995.
Rosenzweig, C. and M.L. Parry. "Potential Impact of Climate Change on World Food
Supply." Nature 367(13 Jan 1994): 133.
Ross, Chuck. "Setting the standard for environmental management." Consulting-Specifying
Engineer 21(Feb 1997): 44-46.
Roth, Alvin E. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1985.
Rowbotham, Elizabeth J. "Dumping and subsidies: Their potential effectiveness for
achieving sustainable development in North America." Journal of World Trade 27 (Dec
1993): 145-173.
Rowlands, I.H. "The Climate Change Negotiations: Berlin and Beyond." Journal of
Environment and Development 4(1995): 105.
Rubin, J.D. "A Model of International Emission Trading, Banking, and Borrowing." Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 31(1996):269-86.
Runge, C. Ford, Francois Ortalo-Magne and Philip Vande Kamp. Freer Trade, Protected
Environment: Balancing Trade Liberation and Environmental Interests. New York:
100

Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994.
Rybczynski, T.M. "Factor Endowment and relative Commodity Prices." Economica 22(Nov
1955): 336-41.
Samdani, G. Sam. "ISO 14000: New passport to world markets." Chemical Engineering
102(Jun 1995): 41.
Samuelson, Paul A. "Ohlin Was Right." Swedish Journal of Economics 73(Dec 1971):
365-84.
Samuelson, Paul, A. "Prices of Factors and Goods in General Equilibrium." Review of
Economic Studies 21(1953):1-20.
Samuelson, Paul A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." Review of Economics and
Statistics 36 (1954):387-89.
Samuelson, Paul A. "Summary on Factor-price Equalization." International Economic
Review 8 (Oct 1967): 286-95.
Sandor, Richard L. "Environmental Futures." Institutional Investor 26(Dec 1992): S23-S24
Sankey, John. "Domestically Prohibited Goods and Hazardous Substances - A New GATT
Working Group Is Established." Journal of World Trade 23(Dec 1989):99-108.
Schelling, Thomas C. "Some Economics of Global Warming." American Economic Review
82 (1992):1-14.
Scheraga, Joel D. "Energy and The Environment: Something New Under the Sun?" Energy
Policy 22(1994): 789-803.
Schindler, David W. "The Mysterious Missing Sink." Nature 398(Mar 11, 1999):105.
Schlagenhof, Markus. "Trade measures based on environmental processes and production
methods." Journal of World Trade 29 (Dec 1995): 123-155.
Schlossberg, Howard. "Electric Utilities Benefit in Controversial Plan to Stop Acid Rain."
Marketing News 26(Feb 3, 1992): 6.
Schmidheiny, Stephan. "The Business of Sustainable Development." Finance &
101

Development 29 (Dec 1992): 24-27.
Schneider, Kerstin, adn Dietmar Wellisch. "Eco-Dumping, Capital Mobility, and
International trade." Environmental and Resource Economics 10 (1997): 387-404.
Shiling, John D. "Reflections on Debt and the Environment." Finance & Development
19(Jun 1992): 28-30.
Shubik, Martin. Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions. Cambridge,
Mass: The MIT Press, 1982.
Siebert, Horst. "Environmental Protection and
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 110 (1974), 494-508.

International

Specialization."

Sietbert, Horst. "Environmental Quality and The Gains from Trade." Kyklos 30 (1977):
657-73.
Siebert, H., J. Eichberger, R. Gronych, and R. Pethig. Trade and the Environment: A
Theoretical Enquiry. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1980.
Slade, Margaret E. "Uniform compliance costs for mineral commodities: Who gains and
who loses?" Land Economics 72 (Feb 1996): 17-32.
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
Reprint, Edwin Cannan ed. New York: The Modern Library, 1937.
Smith, Stephen. "Taxation and the Environment: A Survey." Fiscal Studies 13 (Nov 1992):
21-57.
Smith, V. Kerry, J. Andres Espinosa. "Environmental and Trade Policies: Some
Methodological Lessons." Environment and Development Economics 1(1996): 19-40.
Smock, Robert W. "Trading Allowance Futures." Power Engineering 96(Dec 1992): 10.
Soroos, Marvin. "Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons." Environment 40 (Mar
1998): 7-13, 32-35.
Spellman, James David. "Environmental Needs Challenge the Global Marketplace." Europe
289 (Sep 1989): 18-20.

102

Stern, Robert M. and Keith E. Maskus. "Determinants of the structure of U.S. Foreign
Trade, 1958-76." Journal of International Economics 11(May 1981): 207-224.
Stevens, Candice. "Do environmental policies affect competitiveness?" OECD Observer 183
(Aug/Sep 1993): 22-25.
Subramanian, Arvind. "Genetic Resources, Biodiversity and Environmental Protection: An
Analysis, and Proposals Towards a Solution." Journal of World Trade 26 (Oct
1992):105-109.
Tahvonen, Olli. "Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources." Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 30 (1996): 1-17.
Takayama, Akira. International Trade: An Approach to The Theory. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.
Tan, Kok-Keong, Jian Yu, and Xian-Zhi Yuan. "Existence Theorems of Nash Equilibria for
Non-Cooperative N-Person Games." International Journal of Game Theory 24
(1995):217-222.
Tattum, Lyn and Emily S. Plishner. "Responsible Care: Implementing Care Policy in
Developing Countries." Chemical Week 151(Dec 9, 1992): 48-53.
Tian, Guoqing. "Implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium Allocations." Journal of
Economic Theory 64 (1994):568-84.
Tietenberg, Tom. "Tradeable Permits for Pollution Control When Emission Location
Matters: What Have We Learned?" Environmental and Resource Economics 5 (1995):
95-113.
Tobey, James A. "The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World
Trade: An Empirical Test." Kyklos 43 (1990): 191-209.
Trainer, F.E. "Can Reneable Energy Sources Sustain Affluent Society?" Energy Policy 23
(1995): 1009-1026.
Uekawa, Yasuo. "Generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem." Econometrica
39(1971): 197-217.
Ulph, A. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers
103

Act Strategically." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30 (1996):
265-81.
Ulph, Alistair. "Environmental Policy and International Trade - A Survey of Recent
Economic Analysis." Discussion Papers in Economics and Econmetrics. No. 9423.
University of Southampton, 1994.
UNESCO. Preparatory Documents to the International Technical Conference on the
Protection of Nature, August 1949. Paris: UNESCO, 1949.
UNESCO. Proceedings and Papers of the International Technical Conference on the
Protection of Nature, August 1949. Paris/Brussels: UNESCO, 1950.
van Beers, Cees, and Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh. "An Overview of Methodological
Approaches in the Analysis of Trade and Environment." Journal of World Trade 30 (Feb
1996):143-67.
van Dyke, Brennan. "Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition." Yale Law Journal 100
(Jun 1991): 2707-2726.
Vanek, Jaroslav. "The Factor Proportions Theory: The N-Factor Case." Kyklos 21(Oct
1968): 749-56.
Vanek, Jaroslav and Trent J. Bertrand. "Trade and Factor Prices in A Multi-Commodity
World." in Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. In J.N. Bhagwati, R.W. Jones, R.A.
Mundell, and J. Vanek eds., Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971 p.49-65.
Varian, Hal R. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are
Well-Informed." The American Economic Review 84 (1994):1278-93.
Varian, Hal R. Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company
1992.
Vernon, Raymond. "International Investment and International trade in the Product Cycle."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (1966): 190-207.
Viner, Jacob. International Economics, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951.
Vogt, William. Road to Survival. New York: William Sloane & Associates, 1948.

104

von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
Walter, Ingo, and Judith Ugelow. "Environmental Policie in Developing Countries." Ambio
8 (1979):102-9.
Walter, Ingo. "International Trade and Resource Diversion: The Case of Environmental
Management." Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 110 (1974), 482-93.
Walter, Ingo. "Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to developing Countries." in
Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham eds: Environment and Trade, Totowa, N.J.:
Allanheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982.
Walter, Ingo. "The Pollution Content of American trade." Western Economic Journal
11(1973): 61-70.
Walter, Ingo. International Economics of Pollution. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975.
Walter, Ingo ed. Studies in the International Environmental Economics. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1976.
Watts, A. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games."
Games and Economic Behaviour 13 (1996):269-85.
WCED. Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Webster, David B. "The free market for clean air." Business & Society Review 90 (Summer
1994): 34-37.
Welsch, H. "Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2 Emissions: The Case of
Price Discrimination.."Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27 (1994):
254-58.
Whalley, John and Randall Wigle. "Cutting CO2 Emissions: The Effects of Alternative
Policy Approaches." Energy Journal 12 (1991): 109-124.
Whitin, T.M. "Classical Theory, Graham's Theory, and Linear Programming in International
Trade." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 67(1953): 520-44.
Williams, James R. "Commodity Trade and the factor proportions Theorem." Canadian
105

Journal of Economics 10(1977): 282-88.
Wilson, Thomas W., Jr. International Environmental Action: A Global Survey. Cambridge,
Mass: University Press, 1971.
Xepapadeas, Anastasios. "Managing the International Commons: resource Use and
Pollution Control." Environmental and Resource Economics 5(1995): 375-391.
Zhang, Zhong Xiang. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading System."
Journal of World Trade 32(Oct 1998):219-239.
Zhou, Qingshui. Impacts of Alternatives to the Property Tax for School Financing in West
Virginia. M.S. thesis. West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 1995.
Zhou, Qingshui and Dale Colyer. "Evaluation of Tax Policy Changes: An Econometric
Approach," paper presented at The Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics
Association Annual Meeting, Morgantown, WV, June 1999.

106

Appendix

107

Cost Share ($ per capita) for the $9.9 B. Project
COUNTRY
$ = 0
$ = .3
$ = -.3
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China (incl. HK)
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Côte d'Ivoire
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
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1.4959
0.2660
0.2139
0.1459
3.1340
0.0445
7.0526
9.4319
0.0669
4.6896
3.1245
0.0889
2.4717
0.1964
8.2700
0.9993
0.1056
0.0619
0.3294
0.4966
1.0130
1.4386
6.1821
0.4202
0.0707
0.0654
0.1603
0.1999
7.0807
0.3420
0.1189
0.0616
1.4002
0.2090
0.7018
0.1144
0.3268
1.4123
0.9359
1.4693
0.6182
3.7062
1.3291
0.2067
0.0863
10.7322
0.3519
1.1027
0.5118
0.6068

0.9555
0.1012
0.0762
0.0464
2.4991
0.0099
7.1731
10.4674
0.0168
4.2202
2.4892
0.0244
1.8355
0.0682
8.8229
0.5655
0.0305
0.0152
0.1336
0.2279
0.5756
0.9082
6.0441
0.1834
0.0181
0.0163
0.0524
0.0698
7.2103
0.1403
0.0355
0.0151
0.8768
0.0740
0.3572
0.0338
0.1322
0.8867
0.5193
0.9335
0.3029
3.1079
0.8194
0.0729
0.0234
12.3809
0.1456
0.6427
0.2370
0.2957

2.0616
0.6154
0.5284
0.4042
3.4597
0.1759
6.1040
7.4816
0.2341
4.5874
3.4524
0.2858
2.9300
0.4978
6.8238
1.5544
0.3224
0.2219
0.7148
0.9528
1.5693
2.0060
5.5663
0.8477
0.2434
0.2304
0.4318
0.5038
6.1210
0.7338
0.3503
0.2209
1.9683
0.5198
1.2137
0.3409
0.7108
1.9803
1.4846
2.0359
1.1106
3.8907
1.8979
0.5158
0.2798
8.1894
0.7486
1.6653
0.9731
1.0962

Cost Share ($ per capita) for the $9.9 B. Project
COUNTRY
$ = 0
$ = .3
$ = -.3
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
French Guiana
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. People's Rp.
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Kyrgyztan
Lao People's Dem. Rep.
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
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0.2888
0.6019
0.1299
0.0365
0.5738
0.0365
0.9001
7.2376
9.3502
8.5554
7.4504
1.1726
0.1261
0.0973
9.5672
0.1265
2.8365
0.9260
3.0340
0.4757
0.1752
0.0692
0.2489
0.1011
0.2021
1.5472
8.8456
0.1174
0.3009
0.4373
1.0848
5.5988
5.4461
6.8094
0.6269
13.9760
0.4161
0.0456
0.0965
0.2287
0.4389
3.2369
6.1878
0.0844
0.1102
0.4457
0.6429
0.1611
0.2728

0.1126
0.2926
0.0399
0.0076
0.2749
0.0076
0.4937
7.4188
10.3497
9.2207
7.7035
0.6962
0.0384
0.0274
10.6629
0.0385
2.1952
0.5122
2.3960
0.2155
0.0588
0.0176
0.0928
0.0288
0.0708
0.9983
9.6295
0.0350
0.1188
0.1932
0.6292
5.3135
5.1258
6.8533
0.3085
17.4523
0.1810
0.0102
0.0271
0.0832
0.1940
2.6063
6.0513
0.0227
0.0322
0.1980
0.3187
0.0527
0.1046

0.6519
1.0900
0.3727
0.1532
1.0541
0.1532
1.4447
6.2157
7.4361
6.9878
6.3430
1.7385
0.3651
0.3043
7.5565
0.3659
3.2264
1.4736
3.3821
0.9245
0.4594
0.2397
0.5874
0.3126
0.5078
2.1109
7.1529
0.3472
0.6710
0.8717
1.6463
5.1933
5.0937
5.9559
1.1216
9.8523
0.8418
0.1791
0.3027
0.5537
0.8738
3.5389
5.5699
0.2754
0.3321
0.8833
1.1415
0.4333
0.6264

Cost Share ($ per capita) for the $9.9 B. Project
COUNTRY
$ = 0
$ = .3
$ = -.3
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia, Fed. States
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Republic of Moldova
Reunion
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Samoa

1.6035
18.7582
0.4301
10.4913
0.0790
0.0494
1.3610
0.3921
0.0695
2.8095
0.6532
4.4346
0.1562
1.1908
1.5354
0.9727
9.3825
0.1102
0.4172
0.0350
0.5643
0.7311
0.0600
8.1830
3.2977
7.0792
5.5661
0.1645
0.0802
0.1429
9.6428
2.1651
0.1649
2.2164
0.9689
0.4814
0.6053
0.8086
0.3667
0.9511
3.3521
4.3578
4.9472
0.1223
3.7628
0.4841
0.7413
0.0247
1.6023
1.1452
0.2660
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1.0458
25.5862
0.1890
12.0208
0.0209
0.0113
0.8451
0.1676
0.0177
2.1681
0.3254
3.9243
0.0506
0.7103
0.9885
0.5461
10.3962
0.0322
0.1817
0.0072
0.2690
0.3767
0.0146
8.7024
2.6702
7.2083
5.2732
0.0542
0.0213
0.0451
10.7726
1.5451
0.0544
1.5929
0.5433
0.2188
0.2947
0.4294
0.1536
0.5303
2.7275
3.8363
4.5240
0.0369
3.1697
0.2204
0.3836
0.0046
1.0448
0.6752
0.1012

2.1643
12.1062
0.8616
8.0603
0.2632
0.1894
1.9297
0.8076
0.2406
3.2049
1.1542
4.4113
0.4239
1.7574
2.0996
1.5253
7.4541
0.3321
0.8434
0.1487
1.0418
1.2489
0.2171
6.7735
3.5853
6.1201
5.1720
0.4397
0.2658
0.3983
7.5983
2.6705
0.4404
2.7147
1.5212
0.9323
1.0943
1.3402
0.7705
1.5015
3.6265
4.3578
4.7624
0.3573
3.9322
0.9359
1.2612
0.1166
2.1632
1.7100
0.6154

Cost Share ($ per capita) for the $9.9 B. Project
COUNTRY
$ = 0
$ = .3
$ = -.3
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Vincent/Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
The FYR of Macedonia
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Rep. of Tanzania
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe

6.5404
0.0456
2.6510
0.1873
2.5830
0.0699
8.9505
0.8857
2.7380
0.2542
0.0471
1.0772
4.6360
0.2466
0.8542
0.0236
0.3260
0.4981
8.5489
13.7153
1.0742
0.0498
0.9324
0.5897
0.1592
0.5631
1.4093
0.5855
0.8462
0.7687
0.0969
0.1288
7.8479
6.6384
0.0452
9.6945
1.5955
0.0711
0.4244
0.9948
0.0809
0.3986
0.4449
0.1394
0.2158
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6.5034
0.0102
2.0105
0.0642
1.9437
0.0178
9.7782
0.4834
2.0967
0.0954
0.0107
0.6235
4.1576
0.0917
0.4612
0.0043
0.1318
0.2288
9.2117
17.0304
0.6212
0.0115
0.5168
0.2849
0.0519
0.2683
0.8842
0.2823
0.4556
0.4021
0.0272
0.0394
8.2420
6.6304
0.0101
10.8477
1.0390
0.0182
0.1858
0.5622
0.0215
0.1712
0.1975
0.0437
0.0771

5.7902
0.1791
3.0772
0.4815
3.0218
0.2415
7.2122
1.4285
3.1476
0.5962
0.1832
1.6383
4.5506
0.5837
1.3927
0.1128
0.7096
0.9548
6.9841
9.7234
1.6350
0.1904
1.4808
1.0745
0.4297
1.0404
1.9773
1.0692
1.3836
1.2936
0.3035
0.3705
6.5781
5.8508
0.1780
7.6268
2.1567
0.2443
0.8536
1.5494
0.2676
0.8168
0.8822
0.3916
0.5317
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